Liquidity Transformation Risk: An Investigation of German Open-End Real Estate Funds by Schnejdar, Sebastian
  
Schriften 
 zu Immobilienökonomie 
 und Immobilienrecht 
 
Herausgeber: 
IREIBS International Real Estate Business School 
 
Prof. Dr. Sven Bienert 
Prof. Dr. Stephan Bone-Winkel 
Prof. Dr. Kristof Dascher 
Prof. Dr. Dr. Herbert Grziwotz 
Prof. Dr. Tobias Just 
Prof. Gabriel Lee, Ph. D. 
Prof. Dr. Kurt Klein 
Prof. Dr. Jürgen Kühling, LL.M. 
Prof. Dr. Gerit Mannsen 
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Joachim Möller 
Prof. Dr. Karl-Werner Schulte HonRICS 
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schäfers 
Prof. Dr. Steffen Sebastian 
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Servatius 
Prof. Dr. Frank Stellmann 
Prof. Dr. Martin Wentz 
Band 89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sebastian Schnejdar 
 
Liquidity Transformation Risk: An 
Investigation of German Open-End 
Real Estate Funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

  
 
 
 
Sebastian Schnejdar 
 
Liquidity Transformation Risk: An Investigation of German Open-End Real Es-
tate Funds 
 
 
  
Die Deutsche Bibliothek – CIP Einheitsaufnahme 
Sebastian Schnejdar 
Liquidity Transformation Risk: An Investigation of German Open-End Real Estate Funds 
Regensburg: Universitätsbibliothek Regensburg 2018 
(Schriften zu Immobilienökonomie und Immobilienrecht; Bd. 89) 
Zugl.: Regensburg, Univ. Regensburg, Diss., 2018 
ISBN 978-3-88246-401-6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 978-3-88246-401-6 
© IRE|BS International Real Estate Business School, Universität Regensburg 
Verlag: Universitätsbibliothek Regensburg, Regensburg 2018 
Zugleich: Dissertation zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften, ein-
gereicht an der Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Universität Regensburg 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 10. Juli 2018 
Berichterstatter:  Prof. Dr. Steffen Sebastian 
Prof. Dr. Klaus Röder

ƎưƸƻƼǄƹƲƱƴƲƺƲƻǁǀ
I would like to thank my ﬁrst supervisor and co-author, Professor Dr. Steffen Sebastian,
and my second supervisor, Professor Dr. Klaus Röder, for their guidance and support. I
greatly appreciated their always helpful advice.
Moreover, I would also like to thank my other co-authors Michael Heinrich, and René-
Ojas Woltering for their hard work on our joint research projects.
At last I am deeply grateful to my wife Elizaveta and to my family for their strong encour-
agement.
I
II
ƐƼƻǁƲƻǁǀ
ƎưƸƻƼǄƹƲƱƴƲƺƲƻǁǀ Ɩ
ž ƖƻǁƿƼƱǂưǁƶƼƻ ž
ſ ơƵƲ ƑƲǁƲƿƺƶƻƮƻǁǀ ƼƳ ƟƲƮƹ ƒǀǁƮǁƲ ƓǂƻƱ ƐƹƼǀǂƿƲǀ Ƃ
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 The German Open-End Fund Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Related Literature and Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.1 Fund Run Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.2 Economies of Scale and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.3 Industrywide Spillover Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.4 Institutional Investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.5 Control Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Data, Methodology, and Sample Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.2 Research Design and Variable Deﬁnitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.3 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
III
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
ƀ ƎƻƮƹǆǇƶƻƴ ǁƵƲ ƝƲƿƳƼƿƺƮƻưƲ ƼƳ ƔƲƿƺƮƻ ƜƽƲƻźƒƻƱ ƟƲƮƹ ƒǀǁƮǁƲ ƓǂƻƱǀ Ɓž
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 Secondary Market for Open-End Real Estate Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3 Related Literature and Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3.1 Economies of Scale and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3.2 Fund Management Skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3.3 Open-End Fund Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3.4 Control Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.4 Data, Methodology and Sample Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4.1 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4.2 Research Design and Variable Deﬁnitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4.3 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5.1 Economies of Scale and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5.2 Fund Management Skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5.3 Open-End Fund Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.5.4 Control Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
IV
Ɓ ơƵƲ ƑƶǀưƼǂƻǁ ǁƼ ƛƎV ƼƳ ƑƶǀǁƿƲǀǀƲƱ ƟƲƮƹ ƒǀǁƮǁƲ ƓǂƻƱǀ ƃƆ
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2 The German Open-End Fund Crisis and Regulatory Background . . . . . . 74
4.3 Related Literature and Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3.1 Financial Leverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3.2 Conﬂicts of Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3.3 Portfolio Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.3.4 Spillover Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.3.5 Sentiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.4 Data, Methodology and Sample Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.4.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.4.2 Research Design and Deﬁnition of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4.3 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Ƃ ƐƼƻưƹǂǀƶƼƻ žŽž
ƏƶƯƹƶƼƴƿƮƽƵǆ žŽƂ
V
VI
ƙƶǀǁ ƼƳ ơƮƯƹƲǀ
2.1 Overview Open-End Fund Closures and Liquidations . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Overview Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Explaining Fund Closure Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4 Corr. Matrix: Fund Speciﬁcs, Spillover, and Macroeconomic Variables . . 32
3.1 Overview Secondary Market Fund Fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2 Liquidation Progress since Closure in October 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 Overview Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.4 Corr. Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.5 Pre-Crisis Period: Healthy vs. Distressed Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.6 Explaining Funds‘ Sharpe Ratios (i.e., Risk-adjusted Total Returns) . . . . . 64
4.1 Overview of Distressed Open-End Real Estate Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2 Overview Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.3 Corr. Matrix: Fund-Speciﬁcs, External Variables, and Control Variables . . 93
4.4 Explaining the Discount to NAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
VII
VIII
ƙƶǀǁ ƼƳ ƓƶƴǂƿƲǀ
2.1 Overview Open-End Fund Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Effects of the Liquidity Ratio on the Fund Closure Probability . . . . . . . 27
2.4 Effects of Individual Fund Flows on Fund Closure Probability . . . . . . . 28
2.5 Effects of Fund Age on Fund Closure Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.6 Effects of the Sale by Bank Variable on Fund Closure Probability . . . . . 30
2.7 Effects of Fund Size on Fund Closure Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.8 Effects of the Number of Fund Closures on Fund Closure Probability . . . 33
2.9 Effects of the Share of Institutional Investors on Fund Closure Probability 34
2.10 The Predicted Fund Closure Probability of Distressed Funds I . . . . . . . 36
2.11 The Predicted Fund Closure Probability of Distressed Funds II . . . . . . . 36
2.12 The Predicted Fund Closure Probability of Healthy Funds I . . . . . . . . . 37
2.13 The Predicted Fund Closure Probability of Healthy Funds II . . . . . . . . 37
3.1 Total Return Potential for New Fund Investors I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 Total Return Potential for New Fund Investors II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
IX
4.1 Total NAV Volume and Total Market Capitalization . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2 Discount to NAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3 Overview Open-Ended Fund Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4 Discount to NAV, Fund Speciﬁcs, External and Control Variables . . . . . 91
4.5 Development of Time Dummies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
X
ƐƵƮƽǁƲƿ ž
ƖƻǁƿƼƱǂưǁƶƼƻ
The German public consider residential property as desirable. In economic terms this is a
reasonable wish, since real estate investors gain substantial, relative stable returns from
their direct real estate assets due to rental income or the saving of own rental costs in case
of owner-occupied property. Especially in current times of historical low interest rates, an
investment in direct real estate seems to be even more favorable, when comparing real
estate returns to capital market returns. Real estate asset returns are also considered to
show less volatility compared to stocks. The stock market‘s volatility is one reason for the
common German mistrust in the secondary market.
In addition, direct real estate provides a considerable inﬂation protection due to an gen-
eral increase in property values in response to inﬂationary pressures and index lease agree-
ments. This inﬂation protection is of special importance for German investors, since the
accruing hyperinﬂation in succession of the Great Depression of 1923 was a trauma for
the German society and, therefore, fear of inﬂation became a commonplace in Germans
collective memory.
As a consequence, home ownership is generally considered as a conservative, prefer-
able investment opportunity and serves for numerous people as a central part of their
retirement planning.
Nevertheless, direct real estate investments also exhibit considerable risks. For most pri-
1
1. Introduction
vate investors the purchase of a house or an apartment is a one-in-a-lifetime decision.
These investors get into debt to purchase real estate to an extent, which exceed their
current overall fortune. This considerable lot size risk is especially true for direct real es-
tate investments in Germany‘s “Big 7” cities, which show a tremendous increase in real
estate prices in the last decade. Moreover, due to large lot sizes, the construction of a
diversiﬁed direct real estate portfolio for private investors is unfeasible. Therefore, direct
real estate investments additionally contain a considerable cluster risk.
One preferable investment opportunity for German investors, which are not willing to
participate in the stock market, and seek to avoid the addressed risks of direct real estate
are German open-end real estate funds. Investors of these listed indirect real estate invest-
ments are able to purchase fund shares for a minimum investment amount per share from
EUR 40 to EUR 100, which eliminates the lot size risk.1 For this minimum amount, fund
investors are able to participate on the advantages of direct real estate. Fund investors
also avoid the risk of insolvency associated with excessive property loans. Investors ad-
ditionally beneﬁt from the fund managements‘s portfolio diversiﬁcation, since open-end
real estate funds invest their capital worldwide and across different asset classes.
Moreover, German open-end real estate funds also provide a liquidity transformation for
investors. For decades, these funds gave their investors the opportunity to constantly
redeem fund shares, while most of the capital is invested in long-term real estate assets.
As a consequence of these several advantages, open-end real estate fund are very popular
in Germany, with invested capital of about EUR 171 billion (as of June 2017).
Nonetheless, this provided liquidity transformation bear the risk of a fund closure. In
succession of the global ﬁnancial crisis, starting in October 2008, ten open-end real estate
retail funds, which represent 25% to 30% of the entire asset class, had to close due to
liquidity squeezes.2 Later on, these funds were also forced to liquidate their real estate
portfolio.
1Mitropoulos (2017).
2The share depends considering either all funds, which are officially addressed as open-end real estate retail
funds or “actual” retail funds, which exhibit a minimum investment amount below EUR 10.000.
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This situation lead to a never seen before fund crisis, and creates large uncertainty. This
thesis is designed to reduce the uncertainty of all market participants about an investment
in German open-end real estate funds, and especially about the funds liquidation process.
Accounting for the past helps to lower current uncertainty and, therefore, lead to a more
stable market environment in case of future fund crises. This task is of special importance
for German real estate retail investors, since these investors highly favor low volatility.
The present thesis is divided into three single studies (Chapter 2 to Chapter 4), which
focus respectively on speciﬁc topics associated with the German open-end real estate
fund crisis.
At ﬁrst, it is of particular interest to derive the determinants of fund closures to answer the
question why some funds were forced to close in succession of the global ﬁnancial crisis,
while others, which are exposed to the same market environment, remain unaffected. It
becomes apparent that funds capital inﬂows, as well as larger liquidity ratios diminish fund
closure probability. Moreover, funds immanent economies of scale and scope also show
a decreasing effect on fund closure risk. In contrast, external spillover effects caused by
other open-end real estate fund closures, as well as a greater share of institutional fund
investors increase a funds closure probability.
A further step to diminish investors uncertainty, is to analyze the inﬂuential factors on
fund performance, and the secondary market conditions, especially for distressed fund
shares. It shows that emerging discounts to net asset value (NAV) on the secondary mar-
ket for distressed funds, decrease fund performance due to fund managements loss in
bargaining power in the selling process and due to pressure from current fund investors.
These discounts to NAV are also a measure for the level of investors uncertainty about
the liquidation process in general, as well as about the current real estate asset valua-
tion. Beside the inﬂuence on fund closure risk, funds economies of scale and scope also
positively affects fund performance.
Since, the discount to NAV play a key role to work through this open-end fund crisis, it
is reasonable to analyze, at last, which internal (i.e., fund-speciﬁc) and external factors
3
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inﬂuence the price reduction for fund shares on the secondary market. It became ap-
parent that funds leverage ratio increase discounts to NAV, while a large liquidity ratio
diminish them. Moreover, the discount to NAV depends on conﬂicts of interest between
current fund investors and fund management. Besides these fund-speciﬁc factors, NAV
discounts are also driven by spillover effects from the announcement of other fund liqui-
dations, and by investor sentiment. This sentiment inﬂuence is proxied by the aggregate
level of overall capital ﬂows into the fund industry and by the degree of macroeconomic
uncertainty.
Summarizing, all considered topics, which are associated with the German open-end real
estate fund crisis, exhibit a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of external, predominantly uncertainty-
related, factors.
In succession of this serious fund crisis, there was also a large debate how to change
the legal environment for open-end real estate funds to avoid future fund closures. Sub-
sequently, the investment law was amended several times. To account for this legal
changes, we additionally test the effect of the legal environment (i.e., selling restrictions
for the real estate assets in times of closure) for German open-end real estate funds by
including dummy variables indicating the current selling restriction in all three parts of this
thesis. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of law enforced selling restrictions
on funds closure probability, performance, or discount to NAV.
4
ƐƵƮƽǁƲƿ ſ
ơƵƲ ƑƲǁƲƿƺƶƻƮƻǁǀ ƼƳ ƟƲƮƹ ƒǀǁƮǁƲ ƓǂƻƱ
ƐƹƼǀǂƿƲǀ
This study is the result of a joint project with Michael Heinrich, René-Ojas
Woltering, and Steffen Sebastian
ſŻž ƖƻǁƿƼƱǂưǁƶƼƻ
With invested capital of EUR 145 billion, the German open-end real estate fund industry
is the predominant indirect German real estate investment vehicle and the largest market
for open-end real estate funds worldwide.1
Investors in open-end real estate funds trade with the fund’s investment company, which
sells and redeems shares at net asset value (NAV) on a regular basis. The open-end
structure is associated with considerable “bank run” risk (i.e., fund run risk), because of
the long-term direct real estate investments and daily share redemptions (Bannier et al.
(2008); Weistroffer and Sebastian (2015); Fecht and Wedow (2014)). Therefore, German
regulation demands a minimum liquidity reserve of 5% of a fund’s NAV. In practice, aver-
age liquidity ratios range from 20%-30% (see Downs et al. (2017)). Nevertheless, these
liquidity ratios occasionally prove insufficient, especially during times of high volatility.
1Downs et al. (2016).
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2. The Determinants of Real Estate Fund Closures
The German open-end fund industry was hit severely in the aftermath of the global ﬁnan-
cial crisis. Starting in October 2008, ten public German open-end real estate funds with
total assets under management of about EUR 28 billion were forced to suspend share
redemption.2
We use a panel logit model to explain fund closure probability. Our empirical study is
based on a monthly panel dataset that consists of twenty-four open-end German real
estate retail funds, and which covers all closure events in the history of the asset class.3
We ﬁnd that fund closure probability increases with increasing fund run risk, which is
represented by a fund‘s liquidity ratio and net capital inﬂows. Economies of scale and
scope, proxied by fund size, age, and the presence of a distribution network for fund
shares, help prevent fund closures. Moreover, we ﬁnd evidence that industrywide spillover
effects from the closure of other open-end real estate funds tend to increase fund closure
probability. Lastly, we ﬁnd evidence that a larger share of institutional investors increases
fund closure probability.
Identifying fund closure determinants helps diminish uncertainty about the overall asset
class, while restoring trust in the remaining funds.
The most recent example of a fund crisis was the massive share redemptions from U.K.
open-end real estate funds that took place in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum on
June 23, 2016. Seven public open-end funds from the U.K. closed, which represented
one-half the total assets under management of the U.K. market.4 Hence, open-end fund
participants in foreign countries like the U.K. could learn from the German experience.
The study is structured as follows. The next section (Section 2.2) gives an overview of the
German open-end fund crisis. Section 2.3 describes the used variables, which are mainly
2The regulatory regimewasmodiﬁed in succession of the fund crisis. Nevertheless, our analysis is unaffected
by those changes, since fund closure events occurred under the prior investment law (InvG, effective from
January 1, 2004-July 22, 2013).
3In our sample, we focus on retail funds. We exclude semi-institutional funds, which are primarily intended
for institutional investors. Semi-institutional funds are legally classiﬁed as retail funds, but the minimum
investment ranges from EUR 10,000 to EUR 1 million.
4M&G Property Portfolio, Henderson UK Property PAIF, Standard Life UK Real Estate Fund, Aviva Investors
Property Trust, Columbia Threadneedle UK Property Authorised Investment Fund (PAIF), Canada Life UK
Property Fund, and Aberdeen UK Property Fund.
6
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derived from the existing literature of business failure prediction models. Section 2.4
illustrates the dataset, while the regression results are presented in section 2.5. The last
section exhibits our conclusion.
ſŻſ ơƵƲ ƔƲƿƺƮƻ ƜƽƲƻźƒƻƱ ƓǂƻƱ Ɛƿƶǀƶǀ
German open-end real estate funds are required by law to close (i.e., suspend share re-
demptions) if liquidity ratios fall below 5%. A shortfall in the fund liquidity ratio is very
serious because open-end real estate funds are obliged to sell their real estate assets in
the aftermath of their closure without a discount to the last appraisal value. Closed funds
must sell sufficient assets to raise their cash reserves and fulﬁll share redemptions (i.e.,
reopen).
After a twenty-four-month period, funds are forced to sell off their entire real estate
portfolios and pay out the proceeds to investors. However, selling properties during times
of market turmoil, especially in the ﬁrst months of closure, is almost impossible. Hence,
all the funds that closed in October 2008 were ultimately forced to liquidate after the
twenty-four-month period. Nevertheless, seven of these funds reopened subsequent to
their ﬁrst close in October 2008, but all were forced to close for good for a second time.
Figure 2.1 shows the size of closed German open-end real estate funds (grey bars), as well
as the size of funds in liquidation (dark grey bars). The graph also illustrates the size of
fund reopenings (black bars). During the ﬁrst fund crisis in 2005/2006, two open-end real
estate retail funds with total fund volume of EUR 8 billion, closed. These closures were
caused by short-term uncertainty about the funds’ property valuations. After a short pe-
riod of time, both funds reopened. The second, and larger, crisis began in October 2008,
with the closure of ten funds, with assets under management of about EUR 28 billion. The
reopening of several funds over the following twelve months suggested an upward trend.
Nevertheless all of these funds were forced to close again. As of May 2010, the total fund
size of distressed funds was equal to earlier levels of around EUR 27 billion. Following
7
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ƓƶƴǂƿƲ ſŻžƇ ƜǃƲƿǃƶƲǄ ƜƽƲƻźƒƻƱ ƓǂƻƱ ƐƿƶǀƲǀ
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This ﬁgure shows the total fund size of German open-end real estate funds that either suspended share redemptions (grey bars) or
were already in the process of fund liquidation (dark grey bars). The graph also indicates the total fund size of reopenings (black bars).
the ﬁrst fund liquidation announcement in October 2010, and through August 2012, all
previously closed funds were forced to announce their liquidations. The decreasing fund
size over the sample period, as shown in Figure 2.1, is due to two primary effects: 1) The
proceeds from distressed funds’ sold properties were distributed to investors, and 2) a
decrease in property appraisal values. As of June 2016, about EUR 10 billion of invested
capital remained inaccessible to investors.
Table 2.1 gives a clear overview of the fund closure and liquidation dates.5
5The HansaImmobilia fund was ultimately forced to close and liquidate in 2012 without a twenty-four-
month closing period. Furthermore, the UniImmo global fund closed in 2011 for three months due to
uncertainty about its Japanese property reappraisals following the Tohoku earthquake. The UniImmo
global fund was able to reopen.
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2.3. Related Literature and Hypotheses
ơƮƯƹƲ ſŻžƇ ƜǃƲƿǃƶƲǄ ƜƽƲƻźƒƻƱ ƓǂƻƱ ƐƹƼǀǂƿƲǀ ƮƻƱ ƙƶƾǂƶƱƮǁƶƼƻǀ
fund 1. crisis 2. crisis last closure notice liquidation
AXA Immoselect - 10/08 - 08/09 11/09 10/11
CS Eur. - 10/08 - 06/09 05/10 05/12
DEGI Eur. - 10/08 10/08 10/10
DEGI Int. - 10/08 - 01/09 11/09 10/11
HansaImmobilia - - 10/12 10/12
KanAm Grund. 01/06 - 03/06 10/08 - 07/09 05/10 03/12
MS P2 Value - 10/08 10/08 10/10
UBS 3 Sector RE - 10/08 - 10/09 10/10 09/12
SEB ImmoInvest - 10/08 - 06/09 05/10 05/12
TMW Immobilien - 10/08 - 10/09 02/10 05/11
DEKA Immo. Global - - - -
DEKA Immo.Fonds - - - -
DEKA Immo. Eur. - - - -
EURO ImmoProﬁl - - - -
Inter ImmoProﬁl - - - -
Grundbesitz Eur. 12/05 - 03/06 - - -
Grundbesitz Global - - - -
HausInvest Eur. - - - -
HausInvest Global - - - -
UniImmo D. - - - -
UniImmo EUR. - - - -
UniImmo Global - 03/11 - 06/11 - -
WestInvest 1 - - - -
WestInvest Inter. - - - -
This table provides an overview of all open-end real estate retail funds. It gives the date of the ﬁrst closure of each fund during the ﬁrst
fund crisis in 2005/2006. Nine funds closed in the second fund crisis in October 2008; seven of these reopened for a certain period of
time. Those funds show a second closing date. After twenty-four months of closing, all nine funds were required to announce their
liquidations. Column 5 gives the liquidation date.
ſŻƀ ƟƲƹƮǁƲƱ ƙƶǁƲƿƮǁǂƿƲ ƮƻƱ ƕǆƽƼǁƵƲǀƲǀ
Our theoretical framework on fund closures is based on the literature on business failures.
Business failure prediction models generally focus on identifying an imminent ﬁnancial
crisis by predicting individual ﬁrm insolvencies. Several ﬁrm bankruptcies can cause con-
siderable negative economic effects (i.e., high unemployment rates and reduced stability
of the ﬁnancial market in case of bank failures). Kupiec and Ramirez (2013) ﬁnd that U.S.
bank insolvencies cause a signiﬁcant drop in the overall economic development in the
1900 to 1930 period. Because of the importance of these issues, the literature on failure
prediction models covers a plethora of scientiﬁc work over the past ﬁfty years, beginning
with Beaver (1966). Following Balcaen and Ooghe (2006), Zavgren (1985), Sheppard
9
2. The Determinants of Real Estate Fund Closures
(1994), Zmijewski (1984), Swanson and Tybout (1988), and Becchetti and Sierra (2003),
we focus on conditional probability models, especially logit models. Zhao (2004) for ex-
ample apply a logit model to derive the determinants of fund closings for U.S. open-end
mutual funds in the 1992 to 2001 period.
One common problem of failure prediction models is that the balance sheet items are
inconsistently deﬁned. However, the fund-speciﬁc variables are regulated by law, so they
are identically deﬁned for all funds. Real estate fund closures are therefore somewhat
predestined for use in failure predicting models.
According to Balcaen and Ooghe (2006), another important problem is how to precisely
deﬁne failure. Most studies use a change in corporate legal status as the deﬁnition of a
failure, although the closure of a fund does not immediately imply a loss for investors.
Nevertheless, at the time of closure, the open-end fund structure dissolves, which does
change the intrinsic nature of the fund. Therefore, we use the legal event of “fund clo-
sure” to mean failure in an effort to avoid the problem of poorly deﬁning the dichotomy
of the dependent variable.
Failing to capture corporate failures in a sample time period is another issue for failure
prediction models. As a result, we ﬁnd that the corporate qualities that may lead to a
subsequent failure are assigned to the group of non-failing individuals. Moreover, most
studies on failure prediction are non-random regarding particular industries or size classes.
To avoid a distortion, we include the entire relevant time frame, including all fund closures
independent of age, size, or investment focus.6
ſŻƀŻž ƓǂƻƱ Ɵǂƻ ƟƶǀƸ
Whenever fund investors observe increasing share redemptions that threaten to exceed
a fund‘s liquidity ratios, they have an incentive to redeem their own shares. In the worst
case, this “vicious cycle” leads to a fund closure. The mechanism is similar to a bank run,
and is a serious shortfall of the open-end structure. Therefore, sufficiently large liquidity
6Balcaen and Ooghe (2006).
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ratios are required. During times of economic uncertainty, this safety buffer can diminish
the harmful impact of share redemptions.
Hill et al. (2011) ﬁnd that a higher liquidity ratio, calculated as cash to total assets, leads
to a lower probability of business failure. Gilbert et al. (1990) study the bankruptcies
of seventy-six U.S. ﬁrms from 1974 through 1983, and ﬁnd that larger liquidity ratios
decrease the probability of a bankruptcy. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship
between liquidity ratio and closure probability.
Large capital outﬂows that exceed a fund‘s cash reserves generally lead to fund closure.
Individual fund net ﬂows can be a consequence of poor fundamentals, such as, e.g., low
liquidity ratios, high leverage ratios, or excessive management fees. If investors lose trust
in their investments, they may opt to redeem shares.
On the other hand, fund net ﬂows could affect fund closure probability independent of
fund-speciﬁc variables. Bannier et al. (2008), for example, ﬁnd that investors redeem
shares only because of expected share redemptions by other investors. Those expecta-
tions could be a result of reported capital outﬂows, which by themselves do not allow
for any direct conclusions about a fund‘s economic situation. Therefore, capital outﬂows
may be a crucial element of a “self-fulﬁlling prophecy” that leads to fund closures. Hence,
individual fund net ﬂows could serve as an additional proxy for fund run risk.
The potential impact of a fund run leads us to Hypothesis 1:
ƕǆƽƼǁƵƲǀƶǀ žƇ ƓǂƻƱ ưƹƼǀǂƿƲ ƽƿƼƯƮƯƶƹƶǁǆ ƶƻưƿƲƮǀƲǀ ǄƶǁƵ ƶƻưƿƲƮǀƶƻƴ ƳǂƻƱ ƿǂƻ ƿƶǀƸ.
ſŻƀŻſ ƒưƼƻƼƺƶƲǀ ƼƳ ƠưƮƹƲ ƮƻƱ ƠưƼƽƲ
According to Laitinen (1992), Hill et al. (2011), and Assadian and Ford (1997), corporate
size plays an important explanatory role in business failures. Size is a proxy for potential
economies of scale and scope, as well as for learning effects. Hence, larger companies
should exhibit lower failure probability.7 Moreover, large open-end real estate funds that
7Hill et al. (2011).
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show signiﬁcant growth in prior periods are more likely to attract different, and therefore
sufficiently uncorrelated, target groups. In contrast, smaller funds are more likely to de-
pend on only a few investors. On the contrary, Laitinen (1992) ﬁnds that newly founded
and fast growing companies (i.e., growth in net sales) that exhibit high leverage ratios
also tend to exhibit higher bankruptcy risk. Moreover, Assadian and Ford‘s (1997) study
on U.S. corporate bankruptcies from 1964 through 1991 ﬁnds that larger ﬁrms exhibit a
higher probability of failure.
Although the literature is generally ambivalent about the sign of the inﬂuence on ﬁrm size,
we include fund size as an additional explanatory factor. We suspect that the diminishing
effect of size due to economies of scale and scope is dominant over the increasing effect
of rapid growth on closure probability. Hence, we expect a negative overall inﬂuence of
fund size on closure probability.
Company age is also a signiﬁcant factor in business failures.8 Young companies have a
higher probability of failure than older ones. Analyzing Canadian corporate bankruptcies
in 1996, Thornhill and Amit (2003) state that age indicates economies of scope in the
organizational process. Therefore, we include fund age as a further fund-speciﬁc variable.
We note that eight of the twenty-four open-end real estate funds belong to large German
banks.9 Fund shares are sold by the retail distribution networks of these banks, which are
actively advertised by bank advisors. Therefore, bank-owned funds have direct access to a
plethora of bank customers. In addition, the purchase of open-end real estate fund shares
is often part of clients’ pension provision solutions, which are directly sold by the fund‘s
sponsor (bank). Therefore, these funds have a wider target group and larger economies
of scope than funds without such a distribution network.
Maurer et al. (2004) state that fund sponsors can buy a sufficient amount of their own
fund shares during times of high share redemptions to stabilize liquidity ratios. Hence,
the ﬁnancial power of the fund sponsor may serve as an additional element to prevent
8Thornhill and Amit (2003).
9Hausinvest funds, DEGI funds, Grundbesitz funds, DEKA funds.
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fund closures.10 The open-end real estate funds that use a distribution network belong
to the largest German banks and ﬁnancial syndicates. Hence, we use the existence of
a distribution network as an additional proxy for economies of scale and scope. The
possible inﬂuence of economies of scale and scope are the basis of our second hypothesis:
ƕǆƽƼǁƵƲǀƶǀ ſƇ ƓǂƻƱ ưƹƼǀǂƿƲ ƽƿƼƯƮƯƶƹƶǁǆ ƱƲưƿƲƮǀƲǀ ǄƶǁƵ ƶƻưƿƲƮǀƶƻƴ ƲưƼƻƼƺƶƲǀ ƼƳ ǀưƮƹƲ
ƮƻƱ ǀưƼƽƲ.
ſŻƀŻƀ ƖƻƱǂǀǁƿǆǄƶƱƲ ƠƽƶƹƹƼǃƲƿ ƒƳƳƲưǁǀ
Although fund speciﬁcs are suitable to describe a fund‘s economic situation, Zavgren
(1985) and Maltz et al. (2003) ﬁnd they are not sufficient to fully explain the probability
of fund closure.
According to Aharony and Swary (1983) large-scale bank insolvencies lower the stock
market value of the remaining solvent banks. Moreover, Bannier et al. (2008) analyze
the ﬁrst German open-end fund crisis in 2005/2006, and ﬁnd that the closure of a partic-
ular fund can result in signiﬁcant contagion effects to the overall industry. Closed funds
could be forced to sell assets to reopen again, or, in the case of a subsequent liquidation,
must sell their entire portfolio. Because total assets under management often amount to
several billion euros, ﬁre sales could lead to lower real estate prices for a fund‘s portfolio
properties. Furthermore, open-end real estate funds often share the same investment
focus (e.g., asset class, investment volume, country share), so a signiﬁcant price drop
could affect the overall property prices of the remaining funds. These funds sell parts of
their real estate properties on a regular basis, and, therefore, could be directly affected
by lower overall property prices, especially during liquidity shortages.
Our third hypothesis accounts for these potential negative externalities.
ƕǆƽƼǁƵƲǀƶǀ ƀƇ ƛƲƴƮǁƶǃƲ ǀƽƶƹƹƼǃƲƿ ƲƳƳƲưǁǀ ƳƿƼƺ ǁƵƲ ưƹƼǀǂƿƲ ƼƳ ƼǁƵƲƿ ƳǂƻƱǀ ƺƮǆ ƶƻưƿƲƮǀƲ
ƳǂƻƱ ưƹƼǀǂƿƲ ƽƿƼƯƮƯƶƹƶǁǆ.
10However, in December 2005, when the Grundbesitz investment fund experienced a liquidity shortage,
Bannier et al. (2008) note that the fund sponsor Deutsche Bank was not willing to pay for its “own” fund
shares.
13
2. The Determinants of Real Estate Fund Closures
ſŻƀŻƁ ƖƻǀǁƶǁǂǁƶƼƻƮƹ ƖƻǃƲǀǁƼƿǀ
On average, 98% of all fund shares are held by retail investors. Thus, our research design
focuses solely on retail funds. Nevertheless, some funds have a considerably larger share
of institutional investors than others (the range is typically from 0% to 30%). These
professionals exploit stable, valuation-based fund returns, and regard them as a high-
yielding alternative to money market investments.
Prior to the crisis, when interest rates were low, institutional investors used the open-end
fund structure to “park” their capital in higher-yielding open-end real estate funds. As the
crisis deepened, professionals have to decide if their investment in open-end real estate
funds is still favorable regarding the current risk-return proﬁle. In consequence, they could
even be forced to sell their shares, which could come as a surprise to the remaining retail
investors. This effect increases with the share of professional investors.
According to Larrain et al. (2017), legal restrictions for pension funds led to distressed
sales of Chilean stock holdings, which caused a signiﬁcant higher loss for these stocks
than for others. Hence, retail investors should consider the prevailing blockholder risk,
which could create additional selling pressure and decrease a fund‘s liquidity ratios. Our
fourth hypothesis reﬂects the risk associated with potentially fast-moving “smart money.”
ƕǆƽƼǁƵƲǀƶǀ ƁƇ ƓǂƻƱ ưƹƼǀǂƿƲ ƽƿƼƯƮƯƶƹƶǁǆ ƶƻưƿƲƮǀƲǀ ǄƶǁƵ ǁƵƲ ǀƵƮƿƲ ƼƳ ƶƻǀǁƶǁǂǁƶƼƻƮƹ ƶƻ-
ǃƲǀǁƼƿǀ.
ſŻƀŻƂ ƐƼƻǁƿƼƹ VƮƿƶƮƯƹƲǀ
Our control variables include management costs as an additional fund-speciﬁc factor.
Fund investors, as well as potential new investors, may consider management fees as too
high, which could lead to selling pressure or a lack of inﬂows. In particular, we use the
fund-speciﬁc total expense ratio (TER), and we expect an increasing effect on fund closure
probability.
We also control for funds‘ annual total returns as a measure of fund performance. While
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large returns indicate funds high quality, there is also the possibility, especially in times of
ﬁnancial crisis, that these funds did not fully reappraise their portfolio to current, hence
lower, values. This uncertainty about the current valuation could increase the funds clo-
sure probability.
Total return also includes the entire history of dividend fund payouts. Flagg et al. (1991)
use COMPUSTAT data for the 1975-1981 time frame, and ﬁnd that the reduction of divi-
dends is a signiﬁcant predictor of business failure.11 We expect funds with higher dividend
payouts to exhibit a lower closure probability.
Hill et al. (2011), Dimitras et al. (1996), and Zavgren (1985) ﬁnd that a higher ratio of
total liabilities to total assets increases the probability of bankruptcy. Therefore, we use
funds’ leverage ratios as an additional control variable affecting the probability of fund
closure, and we expect a positive sign.
To strengthen our regression results, we also control for the macroeconomic environment
by considering macroeconomic uncertainty and the returns of competing asset classes.
The macroeconomic development of the national economy, especially during downturns,
has a signiﬁcant impact on business failure probability.12 We use two popular uncertainty
indices to control for macroeconomic inﬂuence. First, the Policy Uncertainty Index Europe
from Baker et al. (2017) for macroeconomic uncertainty. Moreover, we use one of sev-
eral implied volatility indices (shortened VIX), which are widely used to account for stock
market uncertainty (e.g., Bekaert et al. (2013)). In detail, we use the VIX Europe volatil-
ity index based on the Eurostoxx 50. Ben-Rephael (2017) use a similar implied volatility
index based on the S&P100 as a measure of uncertainty in his study to test the impact of
uncertainty on fund management decision to sell assets in U.S. equity mutual funds from
1986 to 2009.
According to Zavgren (1983), higher interest rates can strongly affect bankruptcy rates.
Moreover, Swanson and Tybout (1988) identify the interest rate as one of the two most
important explanatory factors for business failures. Hence, we control for the external
11Flagg et al. (1991).
12Bhattacharjee et al. (2009).
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environment by using the one-year German government bond yield to account for the
German interest rate level, and the dividend yield of the German blue-chip stock market
index (DAX30) to control for the return potential of the competing stock market. We
also control for the development of the fund’s target real estate markets by using the
country-speciﬁc EPRA total return.
ſŻƁ ƑƮǁƮŹ ƚƲǁƵƼƱƼƹƼƴǆŹ ƮƻƱ ƠƮƺƽƹƲ ƑƲǀưƿƶƽǁƶƼƻ
ſŻƁŻž ƑƮǁƮ
We use a panel logit framework to analyze fund closure probability for twenty-four open-
end real estate funds over a 167-month period from August 2002 through June 2016.
These twenty-four funds represent the population of both distressed and healthy open-
end German real estate retail funds. Ten of the twenty-four funds were issued in the
2000s, ﬁve after August 2002. Therefore, our dataset begins in August 2002 in order
to ensure a strongly balanced panel framework. Note further that a new investment law
(InvG) was decided on in January 2002, based on an EU directive. This new regime had
a signiﬁcant effect on the legal environment for open-end real estate funds. The use of
annual accounting information is also common in failure prediction models.13 Hence,
our data consists of monthly, semiannual, and annual fund reports provided by individ-
ual fund management to estimate the impact of fund-speciﬁc variables such as liquidity,
leverage, and management fees on closure probability.14 Furthermore, we use data about
professional investors from MorningStar Direct.
13See, e.g., Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) and Dimitras et al. (1996).
14Asset Management Deutschland, AXA Investment Managers Deutschland, Credit Suisse, KanAm Grund
Kapitalanlagegesellschaft, Morgan Stanley Real Estate Investing, Pramerica Property Investment, SEB As-
set Management, UBS Real Estate.
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ſŻƁŻſ ƟƲǀƲƮƿưƵ ƑƲǀƶƴƻ ƮƻƱ VƮƿƶƮƯƹƲ ƑƲﬁƻƶǁƶƼƻǀ
Our key variable of interest is the closure probability of fund ƶ at the end of month ǁ, which
is calculated as a 0/1 indicator variable. In a fund closure month, the dummy variable is
set to 1. In the following month, the distressed fund is excluded from the panel regression
model. Hence, the closure events are captured solely in the panel logit framework.
For the purposes of our empirical tests, we estimate the following panel regression model:
Closurei,t = α + β1 Liquidityi,t−1 + β2 Individual Fund F lowsi,t
+ β3 ln Fund Sizei,t−1 + β4 ln Agei,t + β5 Sale by banki,t
+ β6 TERi,t−1 + β7 Total Returni,t−1 + β8 ∆ Leveragei,t−1
+ β9 Institutionali,t−1 + β10 Fund Closurei,t
+ β11 Policy Uncertainty Index Europei,t + β12 V IX Europei,t
+ β13 German Bond 1Yi,t + β14 DAX 30 Dividend Y ieldi,t
+ β15 Individual EPRA TRi,t + vi,t
(2.1)
Our regression results are estimated using a panel logit model with heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors.
Since the provided fund-speciﬁc data is published with a signiﬁcant time lag, we include
a one-month time lag for these variables. In contrast, the individual fund ﬂow variable,
age, sale by bank, fund closure indicators, uncertainty indicators, and macroeconomic
control indicators, are included without any time lag.
Due to the large assets under management of open-end real estate funds, a closure of
one or more of these funds will be recognized by both institutional, as well as retail
investors. As a consequence, fund investors will adjust their fund investment strategy
within one month after the closure event occurs. The current market uncertainty and
economic situation are also known by investors at present day. Hence, we do not include
any time lag for the variables.
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We use the following two variables as proxies for fund run risk.
ƙƶƾǂƶƱƶǁǆ denotes the liquidity ratio, which is calculated as the ratio of a fund‘s cash re-
serves to gross asset value (GAV).
ƖƻƱƶǃƶƱǂƮƹ ƓǂƻƱ ƓƹƼǄǀ denotes capital net ﬂows into the speciﬁc open-end real estate
fund. This variable is calculated as the monthly percentage change of net capital fund
ﬂows proportional to the respective fund size.
We use three variables to test for the impact of economies of scale and scope on fund
closure probability.
ƓǂƻƱ ƠƶǇƲ is the overall logarithmic fund volume measured in billions of euros.
ƎƴƲ represents the logarithmic monthly fund age.
ƠƮƹƲ Ưǆ ƏƮƻƸ is a 0/1 indicator variable that is set to 1 if the shares of a particular fund
are sold by the distribution network of the fund sponsor (bank).
We proxy for the effect of potential spillover effects on fund closure probability by using
the closure announcements of other funds.
ƓǂƻƱ ƐƹƼǀǂƿƲ is a counting variable that captures the effect of other fund closure an-
nouncements. Thus, we test for the impact of industrywide spillover effects.
We also test for a relationship between the share of institutional investors and fund clo-
sure probability.
ƖƻǀǁƶǁǂǁƶƼƻƮƹ represents the percentage share of institutional fund investors. It is calcu-
lated as the ratio of a fund’s market value held by institutional shareholders to its overall
market value.
We use the following fund-speciﬁc control variables.
ơƒƟ represents the annual management costs, calculated in percentage of the overall fund
size.
ơƼǁƮƹ ƟƲǁǂƿƻ denotes annual NAV performance measured as the percentage change in
net asset value. Total Return also includes all extraordinary payouts, which are deﬁned as
total fund-speciﬁc payouts in a given month relative to a fund’s NAV.
ƙƲǃƲƿƮƴƲ is the absolute difference (∆) of the fund’s debt compared to its GAV. In detail,
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we use the ﬁrst differences of the leverage ratio to correct for non-stationarity.
Furthermore, we use the general macroeconomic environment to validate our estimation
results. First, we include two variables for market uncertainty. Second, we consider the
impact of bond and stock market returns as alternative investments. We also control for
the country-speciﬁc market return of the fund’s target markets.
PƼƹƶưǆ ƢƻưƲƿǁƮƶƻǁǆ ƖƻƱƲǅ ƒǂƿƼƽƲ is a measurement of overall political uncertainty in the
European market. In detail, Baker et al. (2017) use major newspapers from several Euro-
pean countries and count the number of articles, which include simultaneously the items
“uncertainty”, “economic”, as well as items related to the political situation.15
ƣƖX ƒǂƿƼƽƲ is the Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX), which represents our second
proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty. The index measures implied stock market risk.
Furthermore, we normalize both indices to make the comparison of the magnitude of
both coefficients in the model framework more easier.
ƔƲƿƺƮƻ ƏƼƻƱ 1Y illustrates the German interest level for bond investments. The interest
rate of short-term German government bonds is considered the benchmark for bond
investments. This variable serves as a proxy for the opportunity costs for an investment
in open-end real estate funds.
ƑƎX 30 ƑƶǃƶƱƲƻƱ YƶƲƹƱ captures the return potential of the German stock market. The
DAX 30 consists of the largest thirty companies in Germany. We use the dividend yield
instead of stockmarket performance in order to ﬁnd amore suitable measure of the return
potential of stocks versus fund investments, and bond market returns without speculative
gains.
ƖƻƱƶǃƶƱǂƮƹ ƒPƟƎ ơƟ is calculated as the weighted monthly EPRA total return of a fund’s
target real estate market returns. This variable captures the development of the overall
real estate markets, and serves as a proxy for the business cycle.
15A full list is available at: www.policyuncertainty.com.
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ſŻƁŻƀ ƑƲǀưƿƶƽǁƶǃƲ ƠǁƮǁƶǀǁƶưǀ
Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics for the explanatory variables.
The liquidity ratios show signiﬁcant heterogeneity over time as well as across funds. The
average liquidity ratio is 25.30%, with a range from 0.7% to 81.4%. Several funds were
issued within the sample period. A fund opening is accompanied by a liquidity ratio
of almost 100% because the accumulated capital has not yet been invested. Thus, we
ﬁrst consider newly issued funds after a twenty-four-month period. The liquidity ratios
increase signiﬁcantly from 2012 due to the progressing liquidation of ten funds in the
dataset that were forced to sell their entire real estate property portfolios and transfer the
earnings to investors. Figure 2.2 illustrates the considerable increase in average liquidity
ratios due to property sales beginning in Q3 2012.
The funds show average monthly fund ﬂows of about 0.2% relative to respective fund
volume. Newly issued funds show strong capital inﬂows within the ﬁrst two years, which
could distort the regression results (note again that we only include funds if they are
ơƮƯƹƲ ſŻſƇ ƜǃƲƿǃƶƲǄ ƠǂƺƺƮƿǆ ƠǁƮǁƶǀǁƶưǀ
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Closure 0.006 0.08 0 1 2931
ƓǂƻƱ ƠƽƲưƶﬁưǀ
Liquidity 0.253 0.122 0.007 0.814 2820
Individual Fund Flows 0.002 0.036 -0.566 0.77 3091
Fund Size 36.118 32.772 0.69 136.896 3226
Age 242.927 173.67 25 599 3121
Sale by Bank 0.392 0.488 0 1 3173
Institutional 0.02 0.048 0 0.319 2144
TER 0.008 0.002 0 0.015 2554
Total Return 0.012 0.078 -0.579 0.489 2485
Leverage 0.222 0.113 0 0.641 2797
ƖƻƱǂǀǁƿǆǄƶƱƲ ƠƽƶƹƹƼǃƲƿ
Fund Closure 0.195 0.926 0 9 3246
ƚƮưƿƼƲưƼƻƼƺƶư ƐƼƻǁƿƼƹ VƮƿƶƮƯƹƲǀ
Policy Uncertainty 138.466 55.911 47.694 394.635 3246
VIX Europe 24.939 9.920 11.938 60.677 3246
German bond 1Y 0.016 0.015 -0.006 0.047 3087
DAX 30 Dividend Yield 0.03 0.007 0.019 0.053 3246
Individual EPRA TR 0.005 0.052 -0.274 0.387 2899
This table provides an overview of the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and number of observations for all variables.
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ƓƶƴǂƿƲ ſŻſƇ ƠǂƺƺƮƿǆ ƠǁƮǁƶǀǁƶưǀ
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This ﬁgure illustrates the average progression of fund-speciﬁc, industrywide spillover effects and macroeconomic control variables
from 2002:8 through 2016:6.
at least twenty-ﬁve months old). Moreover, several funds within the same fund family
merged within the sample period.
For example, the WestInvest 1 fund had monthly capital outﬂows of 100% (purely arith-
metical) in October 2009 due to a fund merge with theWestInvest Interselect fund, which
had tremendous capital inﬂows over the same period. For the same reason, the Inter Im-
moproﬁl fund displayed a 248% capital inﬂow in November 2010. We control for fund
merges by excluding these special events from our dataset (n = 5) in order to avoid distor-
tions. Subsequently, the Euro ImmoProﬁl fund now shows the maximum capital inﬂows
of 77.0% at the beginning of 2005, while the Inter ImmoProﬁl fund has -56.6% capital
outﬂows in October 2009.
Fund size ranges from EUR 69 million to EUR 13.6 billion, with an average size of EUR 3.6
billion and a median of EUR 2.5 billion. Fund size is measured in EUR 100 million. The
Deka Immobilien Europa fund is the largest open-end real estate fund, with an average
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of EUR 9.87 billion and a maximum of EUR 13.6 billion. In contrast, distressed funds
show a signiﬁcantly negative trend in fund size. For example, the Morgan Stanley P2
value fund had a minimum of only EUR 69 million as of June 2016, due to advanced fund
liquidations. But the remaining funds ultimately boosted their fund volumes due to the
increased demand for open-end fund shares in Germany since 2014.
Figure 2.2 shows that average fund size decreased from EUR 4.5 billion in January 2004,
due to newly issued funds (i.e., low fund volume), to the lowest levels over the 2006-
January 2011 period of about EUR 3 billion. Since then, average fund size has risen,
despite the fact that several funds were forced to liquidate. Signiﬁcant capital inﬂows
into the remaining funds led to an average fund volume of about EUR 3.5 billion as of
June 2016.
Several funds were issued after August 2002, but within our sample period. The oldest
fund at the beginning of the dataset was the UniImmo global fund at thirty-six years (433
months).
The Sale by Bank variable displays a mean of 0.39. This is because the vast majority of
open-end real estate funds never switched from using a distribution network to sell fund
shares to a system without a direct selling feature, or vice versa. Since October 2012,
the DEGI fund family was the sole fund choosing to use a distribution network. Hence,
about 40% of all funds sell shares via a distribution network.
Institutional shareholders on average represent 2% of all fund investors. The UBS 3 Sec-
tor Real Estate fund reports an institutional share of up to 31.9%, while DEGI Europa has
a 0.00% minimum share and never exceeds 0.30%. According to Figure 2.2, the aver-
age share of institutional investors signiﬁcantly increased to about 6% from August 2002
through Q1 2011. It subsequently decreased dramatically through June 2016. Neverthe-
less, the graph may be biased due to the quality of the data provided.
For example, the Morningstar Direct data is not fully available, because they only report
data from seventeen of the twenty-four open-end real estate funds. Furthermore, at the
end of the dataset, open-end funds with generally larger shares of institutional investors
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(such as the UBS 3 Sector Real Estate fund and the TMW Immobilien Welt fund) had
provided insufficient information. Therefore, the sharp decline in the average share of
institutional investors reported appears excessive.
Closure announcements are clustered in a few months over the sample period. The mean
of the counting variable is 0.195. In October 2008, nine funds suspended share redemp-
tions, and four funds had been forced to close as of November 2009 and May 2010. All
nine funds that closed in October 2008 reopened, but were ultimately forced to close
again from November 2009 through October 2010. Hence, the counting variable, which
captures every fund closure event, includes some duplicates.
TER denotes annual management costs for each investor as a percent of fund volume.
Funds‘ expense ratios range from 0% to 1.5% of average annual fund volume. The aver-
age total expense ratio is 0.8%. Funds’ total expense ratios generally increase over time.
The CS Euroreal fund shows the largest management fees at the beginning of the sample
period in 2002, with a 1.5% expense ratio.
Total Return is deﬁned as the annual change in net asset value. Extraordinary payouts to
investors, due to the selling off of real estate portfolios, are considered in the calculation
of total return for all distressed funds, as well as in the regular dividend payout for both
healthy and distressed funds. Average annual total return is 1%. Table 2.2 shows a
minimum annual total return of -57.90% for the MS P2 value fund in October 2010, and
a maximum of +48.9% for the Inter ImmoProﬁl fund in January 2016.
Leverage ratios also differ dramatically across funds. Five distressed funds (DEGI Interna-
tional, DEGI Europa, TMW Immobilien Welt, MS P2 Value, and UBS 3 Sector Real Estate)
report leverage ratios of zero as of the end of the sample period. The Grundbesitz Europa
fund exhibited a leverage ratio of 64.1% in Q3 2006 and Q1 2007. The average for all
funds is 22.2%. In addition, the KanAM Grundinvest fund, which was forced to close in
October 2008, exhibited an average leverage ratio of 38.66%, while the healthy Deka
Immobilien global fund had only 18.48%.
Figure 2.2 shows that the average leverage ratio tended to rise through 2012. Afterward,
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it decreased consistently and signiﬁcantly to the end of the sample period, largely because
distressed funds repay their property-related loans. In contrast, healthy funds show stable
leverage ratios across time.
According to Table 2.2, our ﬁrst uncertainty indicator, the Policy Uncertainty Index, dis-
plays an average index value of 138.46, with the lowest value of 47.69 in Q4 2007. In
contrast, the Brexit referendum in June 2016 caused tremendous uncertainty (maximum
of 394.63) in the overall European economy.
Our second uncertainty indicator is the Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX) (commonly
referred to as VIX). The VIX displays an average value of 24.94. The highest stock market
uncertainty, at 60.67, is measured in Q1 2009; the lowest value of 11.93 was recorded
in July 2005.
The interest rate of German government bonds with one-year maturity ranges from -0.6%
in June 2016 to +4.7% in June 2008. The average interest rate is 1.6%. Figure 2.2 shows
that government bond yields increase over 2002-2008. Due to the expansive monetary
policy in the wake of the global ﬁnancial crisis, interest rates decreased considerably and
even reached negative values toward the end of the sample period.
On average, the thirty largest German companies distribute 3% annual payouts. The
variable shows a minimum dividend of 1.9% in December 2004 and a maximum of 5.3%
in February 2009. According to Figure 2.2, the DAX 30 exhibited relatively low dividend
yields from 2004 through 2005. Afterward, dividends increased. In summary, the DAX
30 companies distributed signiﬁcant and relatively stable annual dividend payments of
about 2% to 4%.
Individual EPRA total returns ranged from -27.4% to 38.7%, with an average of 0.5%.
Figure 2.2 shows a rather volatile development of the weighted funds’ target real estate
markets. The ﬁgure shows that the minimum was reached in Autumn 2008 during the
ﬁnancial market turmoil of the global ﬁnancial crisis. In subsequent years, we observe
a signiﬁcant recovery of the funds’ target real estate markets, with mainly positive total
returns.
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ſŻƂ ƟƲǀǂƹǁǀ
Table 2.3 contains the results of four panel logit regression models (I-IV). The ﬁrst model
includes only fund-speciﬁc explanatory variables (I), while the second speciﬁcation also
includes the industrywide spillover variable (II). The third model (III) is estimated using
fund-speciﬁc, industrywide spillover, and macroeconomic control variables.16
Model IV further includes the share of institutional investors. Unfortunately, Morningstar
Direct provides data on fund ownership structure for only seventeen of the twenty-four
funds. Hence, we lose 420 observations from model IV versus model III (N = 2,037). The
standard errors of the regression coefficients are in parentheses. Due to the non-linear
relationship, the interpretation of regression coefficients in panel logit models is not intu-
itive. While our empirical tests are based on the statistical signiﬁcance of the coefficients,
we use graphical analyses to judge the economic signiﬁcance of our results.17 Figures 2.3
to 2.9 show the mean marginal effect of a variation of the respective independent vari-
able over all considered combinations with the other independent variables. We derive
these ﬁgures from our preferred regression model (III), and the marginal effects of the
share of institutional investors from model IV.
We ﬁrst focus on testing Hypothesis 1, to determine whether higher fund run risk causes
higher fund closure probability. Fund run risk is represented by the fund liquidity ratio,
as well as by individual fund capital inﬂows. Both variables show the expected negative
inﬂuence on closure probability. A larger liquidity ratio c.p. signiﬁcantly reduces closure
probability in the next month. This negative effect is robust for all four model speciﬁca-
tions.
Figure 2.3 illustrates that closure probability increases if a fund exhibits a liquidity ratio
of less than 5%, because, under German law, these funds are forced to close. Funds
with liquidity ratios at 5% exhibit closure probabilities of about 2.5%. Under a liquidity
16We control for the legal fund environment (e.g., the selling restrictions on the properties) and do not
conﬁrm a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on fund closure probability; According to Sheppard (1994) and Hall (1994),
the level of diversiﬁcation has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on business failures, but we ﬁnd no inﬂuence of
regional or sectoral diversiﬁcation (Herﬁndahl index) on the probability of a fund closure.
17Greene (2010), Downs et al. (2016).
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ơƮƯƹƲ ſŻƀƇ ƒǅƽƹƮƶƻƶƻƴ ƓǂƻƱ ƐƹƼǀǂƿƲ ƝƿƼƯƮƯƶƹƶǁǆ
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
ƓǂƻƱ ƠƽƲưƶﬁưǀ
Liquidityi,t−1 -0.0583** -0.0861** -0.107* -0.221**
(0.0249) (0.0378) (0.0610) (0.0981)
Individual Fund F lowsi, t -0.177** -0.125*** -0.143*** -0.310***
(0.0781) (0.0349) (0.0386) (0.118)
ln Fund Sizei,t−1 0.950* 0.800* 0.709* 2.134*
(0.560) (0.461) (0.405) (1.285)
ln Age i, t -1.271*** -0.772 -1.018* -1.704**
(0.480) (0.503) (0.578) (0.830)
Sale by Banki,t -1.287 -2.062** -1.666* -1.146
(0.796) (0.922) (0.864) (0.965)
Institutionali,t−1 0.234***
(0.0868)
TERi,t−1 3.485*** 5.100*** 5.032** 7.212
(1.236) (1.571) (2.309) (4.406)
Total Returni,t−1 0.103*** 0.0557 0.0392 -0.0176
(0.0387) (0.0668) (0.0889) (0.278)
∆ Leveragei,t−1 0.184*** 0.189*** 0.168** 0.112
(0.0511) (0.0556) (0.0675) (0.0726)
ƖƻƱǂǀǁƿǆǄƶƱƲ ƠƽƶƹƹƼǃƲƿ
Fund Closurei,t 0.620*** 1.063*** 1.120**
(0.107) (0.408) (0.475)
ƚƮưƿƼƲưƼƻƼƺƶư ƐƼƻǁƿƼƹ VƮƿƶƮƯƹƲǀ
Policy Uncertainty Index Europei,t -0.383 -0.318
(0.626) (0.798)
V IX Europei,t -0.212 -0.475
(0.621) (1.065)
German Bond 1Yi,t -0.727* -0.394
(0.387) (0.457)
DAX30 Dividend Y ieldi,t -1.978 -2.578**
(1.234) (1.224)
Individual EPRA TRi,t -0.0521 -0.135
(0.0826) (0.0928)
Constant -3.607 -7.021** 1.124 0.168
(2.359) (3.201) (4.275) (4.628)
Observations 2,046 2,046 2,037 1,617
McFadden R-squared 0.287 0.530 0.568 0.675
This table gives the results of the panel logit model regression. Model I shows the inﬂuence of the fundamentals that explain the
probability of fund closure. Model II further includes, besides the fund-speciﬁc variables, the industrywide spillover effects. Model III,
our preferred model, includes further the macroeconomic control variables. Model IV adds the share of institutional investors. The
Policy Uncertainty and VIX Europe variables are standardized with zero mean and a standard deviation of one. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. Stars denote signiﬁcance as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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This ﬁgure compares how fund closure probability reacts to changes in fund run risk as represented by the liquidity ratio. The dashed
lines denote the 95% conﬁdence interval.
ratio of 10%, the probability decreases to 2%. Average liquidity ratios of 25%, as well as
higher ratios of up to 50%, are associated with closure probabilities of around 1%. These
results are in line with unconditional closure probabilities. Our dataset contains about
twenty fund closure events, which equates to a 1% closure probability over 2,037 total
observations. A larger share of cash and short-term money market positions serve as a
safety buffer for investors. Hence, a higher liquidity ratio decreases the risk of beginning
a vicious cycle. Especially if the liquidity ratio is already low, the decreasing impact on
closure probability of a 1% increase in the liquidity ratio is more than proportional.
In addition, fund capital inﬂows exhibit a signiﬁcant and robust negative effect on closure
probability across all four model speciﬁcations. Capital inﬂows into a particular fund re-
duce closure probability c.p., while large contemporaneous capital outﬂows signiﬁcantly
increase it. Figure 2.4 illustrates the marginal impacts. Large capital outﬂows of about
6.5% lead to a 1.2% closure probability, while capital outﬂows of 4.5% exhibit a 1%
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This ﬁgure compares how fund closure probability reacts to changes in fund run risk as proxied for by individual fund ﬂows. The
dashed lines denote the 95% conﬁdence interval.
closure probability. Positive capital ﬂows lead to a signiﬁcantly lower closure probability
of 0.7% to 0.5%.
In summary, both proxies are consistent with Hypothesis 1. Fund closure probability rises
during times of higher fund run risk.
Next, we examine Hypothesis 2, whether fund closure probability is driven by economies
of scale and scope. Our three proxy variables are age, the sale by bank dummy variable,
and fund size.
We use the logarithm of fund age as an additional inﬂuential factor that affects fund
closure probability. Older funds exhibit c.p. lower closure probability. The negative effect
is signiﬁcant in models I, III, and IV. The negative sign on the regression coefficient is in
line with the literature. Older companies or funds are likely to obtain larger economies of
scope in the organizational process because they have had more time to establish efficient
processes and structures.
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This ﬁgure compares how fund closure probability reacts to changes in the economy of scope and scale variable as proxied for by
fund age. The dashed lines denote the 95% conﬁdence interval.
Figure 2.5 shows how the marginal effects of logarithmic age affect fund closure prob-
ability. Age is varied over two standard deviations below and above the mean. Average
fund age is about twenty years. A logarithmic fund age of 3.52 (i.e., two standard de-
viations below the mean) is associated with a closure probability of about 2%. In the
case of a two-standard deviation variation above the mean (6.52), the closure probability
decreases considerably to 0.5%.
Open-end real estate funds that use the retail distribution network of their issuing sponsor
(bank) show c.p. lower fund closure probability. The negative sign is robust among all
four model speciﬁcations. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant inﬂuence only in models II
and III.
Figure 2.6 illustrates that funds without a distribution network exhibit a closure probability
of about 1.25%. Those with a distribution network exhibit a considerably lower closure
probability of 0.5%.
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This ﬁgure compares how fund closure probability reacts to changes in the economy of scope and scale variable, as represented by
the sale by bank variable. The dashed lines denote the 95% conﬁdence interval.
Interestingly, larger funds exhibit c.p. a higher fund closure probability. This positive effect
is signiﬁcant for all four model speciﬁcations. Figure 2.7 illustrates the marginal effects
of a variation in fund size on closure probability. We use the logarithm of fund size in the
model speciﬁcation. For example, for a logarithmic fund size of 0.88, the fund closure
probability is about 0.25%; for a larger fund size of 4.88, the probability would be about
1.5%.
In summary, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant inﬂuence in two of our three proxies for economies of
scope and scale on fund closure probability. Fund age and the sale by bank variables
show the expected negative signs, and are statistically signiﬁcant in the third model (III).
Next, to test for the presence of negative spillover effects from other fund closures (Hy-
pothesis 3), we use the number of closures in each month of our sample period. The
coefficient on the fund closure variable is positive and signiﬁcant across all model spec-
iﬁcations. As illustrated in Figure 2.8, the probability is almost zero if there are zero to
30
2.5. Results
ƓƶƴǂƿƲ ſŻƄƇ ƒƳƳƲưǁǀ ƼƳ ƓǂƻƱ ƠƶǇƲ Ƽƻ ƓǂƻƱ ƐƹƼǀǂƿƲ ƝƿƼƯƮƯƶƹƶǁǆ
0
.0025
.005
.0075
.01
.0125
.015
.0175
.02
.0225
.025
Fu
nd
 C
lo
su
re
 P
ro
ba
bi
lity
.88 1.38 1.88 2.38 2.88 3.38 3.88 4.38 4.88
ln Fundsize
This ﬁgure compares how fund closure probability reacts to changes in the economy of scope and scale variable as proxied for by
fund size. The dashed lines denote the 95% conﬁdence interval.
three fund closures of other funds in the respective month. In months with more than
three closures, the probability increases substantially by about 10% with every additional
event. In October 2008, when nine funds were forced to close, the closure probability of
the remaining funds was approximately 70%.
According to Table 2.4, the dependent variable is relatively strongly correlated with the
fund closure variable at about +0.42. In summary, we ﬁnd evidence that spillover effects
affect closure probability.
We also test whether the share of institutional investors affects the closure probability
of open-end real estate funds (Hypothesis 4). Model IV in Table 2.3 shows that a larger
share of institutional investors signiﬁcantly increases c.p. closure probability in the next
month.
Figure 2.9 illustrates that a 0% share of institutional investors leads to a 0.75% fund
closure probability, while an 11.5% share, which represents a two-standard deviation
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This ﬁgure compares how fund closure probability reacts to changes in the spillover variable as represented by the number of fund
closures. The dashed lines denote the 95% conﬁdence interval.
increase above the mean, exhibits a 2.5% closure probability.
Our regression results are in line with the general notion that having a higher share of in-
stitutional investors is tied to signiﬁcant blockholder risk for the remaining retail investors.
Professional fund investors hold and are able to redeem a high proportion of fund shares.
This can lead to additional selling pressure on fund management, which can also increase
closure probability due to decreasing liquidity ratios.
This fundamental effect becomes even stronger because institutional investors can re-
deem their shares suddenly regardless of fund performance. This could come as a surprise
for remaining investors due to their short-term investment horizons. Retail investors who
take this potential blockholder risk into account may be inclined to sell their own shares
more rapidly compared to those in funds held mainly by private investors. Given that we
lose 420 observations due to unavailable data, we test the inﬂuence of institutional share
based on only 1,617 observations. Thus, although the results are relatively robust, they
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This ﬁgure compares how fund closure probability reacts to changes in the share of institutional investors. The dashed lines denote
the 95% conﬁdence interval. The ﬁgure is based on the results of the fourth model speciﬁcation (model IV).
should be interpreted with caution.
Furthermore, we use a set of fund-speciﬁc and macroeconomic control variables. We
include TER, fund total return, and fund leverage ratio as fund-speciﬁc control variables
in all model speciﬁcations (I-IV). Consistent with the literature, management fees (TER),
as well as the leverage ratio, exhibit a signiﬁcant and robust positive effect on closure
probability across the model speciﬁcations. Note that higher leverage ratios amplify the
effect of potentially negative property reappraisals, and could cause additional selling
pressure on fund management. Moreover, if investors consider management fees too
high, they are more likely to redeem their shares. The total return variable shows no
consistent regression results across the model speciﬁcation.
In models III and IV, we control further for macroeconomic environment. In particular,
we test for the impact of two widely used uncertainty indicators, the VIX Europe and the
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Policy Uncertainty Index Europe, to capture prevailing macroeconomic uncertainty. We
also use short-term German government bond yields and the DAX 30 dividend yield to
control for the return potential of alternative asset classes (i.e., bonds and stocks).
We then control for the total return of funds’ target real estate markets. The control vari-
ables show no consistent or signiﬁcant results across the different model speciﬁcations.
This is potentially due to the considerable cross-correlation the variables exhibit with each
other.
Table 2.4 shows that economic uncertainty is strongly correlated with the DAX 30 div-
idend yield (+0.46), and negatively correlated with the government bond interest rate
(-0.68). In addition, stock market uncertainty shows a similar relationship with the DAX
30 dividend yield (+0.61) and the interest rate level (-0.22). The individual EPRA total
return shows no strong correlation with any other macroeconomic control variables.
The regression results for the four model speciﬁcations are relatively robust. Model I,
which includes solely fund-speciﬁc factors, shows a McFadden R-squared of 28.7%. The
model ﬁt signiﬁcantly increases by adding the counting variable for the number of fund
closures in the respective month. Hence, model II exhibits a McFadden R-squared of
53.0%. Model III further includesmacroeconomic control variables in order to validate the
regression results, which increases the model ﬁt of about 4% to a McFadden R-squared
of 56.8%. Model IV adds the share of institutional investors, and exhibits a McFadden
R-squared of 67.5%.
We illustrate the model ﬁt of our preferred model (III) by conducting an in-sample predic-
tion of closure probability for all twenty-four funds. Figures 2.10 to 2.13 show the results
for all distressed funds and for the remaining healthy funds, respectively. According to
Figures 2.10 and 2.11, eight of the twelve distressed funds exhibited considerable predic-
tive closure probability in October 2008, at the peak of the second fund crisis. The graphs
show the prediction for every month in the sample period. Hence, we mark the periods
after the actual fund closure event, because these predictions are only theoretical.
Figures 2.12 and 2.13 illustrate the signiﬁcant closure probability of the remaining healthy
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This ﬁgure shows the predicted fund closure probability of all distressed open-end real estate funds. It validates the predictive power
of the panel logit regression. Most funds show their highest closure probability at the date of actual closure. Predicted fund closure
probability after the actual closure date is only theoretical, and is therefore denoted as a dashed line.
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This ﬁgure shows the predicted fund closure probability of all distressed open-end real estate funds. It validates the predictive power
of the panel logit regression. Most funds show their highest closure probability at the date of actual closure. The predicted fund
closure probability after the actual closure date is only theoretical, and is therefore denoted as a dashed line.
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This ﬁgure shows the predicted fund closure probability of all healthy open-end real estate funds. It validates the predictive power of
the panel logit regression.
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This ﬁgure shows the predicted fund closure probability of all healthy open-end real estate funds. It validates the predictive power of
the panel logit regression.
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funds. At the height of the crisis, in October 2008, half of all the healthy funds exhibited
low closure probability. Only one of the twelve funds showed a closure probability higher
than 50%. Overall, the model possesses high predictive power. Nevertheless, some funds
that exhibit all the determinants of distressed funds remain open in the aftermath of a
global ﬁnancial crisis. This may indicate that simple bad luck sometimes plays a part in
fund closures.
ſŻƃ ƐƼƻưƹǂǀƶƼƻ
This study contributes to the literature on failure prediction models and liquidity transfor-
mation risk in several ways. We began by noting that about one-third of all open-end
German real estate funds were forced to close during the ﬁrst and second fund crises, in
2005/2006 and October 2008, respectively. This led to signiﬁcant lower demand for fund
shares by retail investors from 2008 through 2015. Second, we use fund-speciﬁcs, indus-
trywide spillover effects, as well as macroeconomic control variables to analyze the most
important factors driving fund closure probability. On the fund-speciﬁc side, we ﬁnd that
fund closure probability is driven by the degree of fund run risk. Funds with low liquidity
ratios and capital outﬂows exhibit higher probability of closure. Fund management could
reduce capital outﬂows by marketing the funds to a more diverse group of investors (i.e.,
focus on retail investors by using a bank to distribute their shares). It may also be possible
to reduce the risk of fund closure by using a more conservative investment strategy with
larger liquidity ratios. However, higher shares of cash and money market deposits come
at the expense of lower returns. We also document that economies of scale and scope
help decrease fund closure probability. We ﬁnd evidence of negative spillover effects from
the closure announcements of other funds. These effects are outside the control of fund
management. We further ﬁnd that having a larger share of institutional investors signiﬁ-
cantly increases fund closure probability. Ultimately, we ﬁnd that fund management can
prevent closures in part by following a more conservative fund strategy and by focus-
ing on well-established funds that use distribution networks to sell shares. Nevertheless,
38
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systematic closure risk is a somewhat inherent feature of the open-end structure.
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40
ƐƵƮƽǁƲƿ ƀ
ƎƻƮƹǆǇƶƻƴ ǁƵƲ ƝƲƿƳƼƿƺƮƻưƲ ƼƳ ƔƲƿƺƮƻ
ƜƽƲƻźƒƻƱ ƟƲƮƹ ƒǀǁƮǁƲ ƓǂƻƱǀ
This study is the result of a joint project with Steffen Sebastian
ƀŻž ƖƻǁƿƼƱǂưǁƶƼƻ
For decades, German open-end real estate funds have been considered as an preferred
investment opportunity for retail investors. As a result, Germany has the largest market
for open-end real estate funds in the world, with assets under management of about EUR
171 billion.1
Basically, an open-end real estate fund investment gives investors the chance to obtain
signiﬁcant returns from long-term direct real estate assets. Fund share prices (i.e., net
asset values) are based on real estate asset values, which are regularly reevaluated.2 Ac-
cording to the valuation method, fund prices exhibit less volatility than other listed invest-
ment vehicles, such as REITs.3 Besides the signiﬁcant return potential and lower volatility,
1BVI Statistics 06/2017. The overall sum can be divided between open-end real estate retail funds, with a
share of EUR 91 billion, and open-end real estate special funds for institutional investors, with about EUR
80 billion.
2Downs et al. (2017); Weistroffer and Sebastian (2015); Fecht and Wedow (2014).
3Sun et al. (2015) illustrate the exceptionally high stock market volatility of REITs versus their direct real
estate portfolios over the January 2007-December 2011 period.
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fund investors also received the right to constantly buy and sell fund shares from/to fund
management.
However, this liquidity transformation provided by fund management has actually caused
signiﬁcant “bank run” risk (Bannier et al. (2008); Weistroffer and Sebastian (2015)), which
could lead to fund closures during times of high share redemptions. This risk became fully
apparent since October 2008, when the closure and subsequent liquidation (i.e., forced
selling of the entire real estate portfolio under time pressure) of ten German open-end
real estate retail funds, worth EUR 28 billion, caused the most severe fund crisis in the
history of open-end real estate funds. Seven of these funds were able to provide enough
liquidity to reopen again for a short period of time. Nevertheless, all the funds closed
again due to liquidity shortages.
After the maximum closing period of twenty-four months, which was determined by
German investment law, all of these open-end real estate funds were forced to announce
liquidations of their real estate portfolios.4
The open-end real estate fund crisis is also a current topic because the liquidation process
of these distressed funds has continued through today. As of March 2017, approximately
EUR 7 billion remains inaccessible to investors. Moreover, distressed fund shares are only
traded on the secondary market, and exhibit on average considerable discounts to NAV.
This severe crisis was a shock for fund retail investors, since investments in open-end real
estate funds were previously considered conservative. Therefore, the fund closures have
created a high degree of uncertainty about the future of these investments for all fund
investors, particularly for investors in distressed funds.
This study aims to diminish somewhat this overwhelming investor anxiety about invest-
ments in distressed funds, as well as in the remaining healthy open-end real estate funds.
To that end, we analyze the determinants of open-end real estate fund performance and
describe the current secondary market conditions for distressed fund shares.
4As a consequence of this crisis, the legal environment for open-end real estate funds has changed. Since
July 2013, fund investors face a minimum twenty-four-month holding period for fund shares.
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We use a panel dataset, which consists of twenty-four German open-end real estate retail
funds. These twenty-four funds represent the population of the asset class of German
open-end real estate retail funds.5 The monthly dataset spans the August 2002-March
2017 period.
Existing discounts to NAV on the secondary market for fund shares reﬂect the capital mar-
kets’ current price expectations for real estate assets. Therefore, signiﬁcant discounts to
NAV lower fund management’s bargaining power during the liquidation process. More-
over, dissatisﬁed fund investors who face these high discounts to NAV are a further source
of pressure on fund management. This pressure from current investors also weakens fund
management’s bargaining position. And, because the performance of distressed funds
depends so heavily on the revenue from liquidating the real estate assets, such pressure
could lower fund performance. Exceptionally large discounts to NAV also indicate greater
uncertainty about the current asset valuation techniques, and about the liquidation pro-
cess. Finally, we ﬁnd that economies of scale and scope, as well as the development of
fund target markets, also affects fund performance.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section presents a study
on the secondary market for fund shares. We then show how our explanatory variables
are linked to the literature on performance studies, followed by a section describing the
data. The subsequent section explores the results of the panel model. The ﬁnal section
concludes.
ƀŻſ ƠƲưƼƻƱƮƿǆ ƚƮƿƸƲǁ ƳƼƿ ƜƽƲƻźƒƻƱ ƟƲƮƹ ƒǀǁƮǁƲ ƓǂƻƱǀ
Fund investors’ capital in distressed funds is almost entirely constrained. Because all open-
end real estate funds are listed, the only way to redeem shares is to sell them on the sec-
ondary market, where investors face tremendous discounts to NAV (up to 60%). There-
fore, most fund investors remain invested, preferring to wait for the end of the liquidation
5We include only actual open-end retail funds, which provide a minimum investment opportunity for in-
vestors of less than EUR 10.000 per fund share. Hence, we exclude semi-institutional funds, which are
also referred to as open-end real estate retail funds.
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process, since the fund closure and liquidation do not in theory cause any ﬁnancial loss
for them. If fund management is able to sell all their real estate properties at NAV, in-
vestors would not suffer any losses from their distressed fund investments. In contrast,
if fund management sells all their real estate properties under pressure, it could lead to
“ﬁre sales” or reveal potential asset overvaluations, which could cause signiﬁcant losses
for fund investors. Therefore, there is a great uncertainty surrounding the current asset
valuation.
One measure of this uncertainty can be seen in the general secondary market conditions
for German open-end real estate funds. Table 3.1 shows the fee structure of this market.
Investors pay an initial charge of 5% of current NAV to purchase open-end fund shares.
Some funds charge even higher fees, up to 5.5%. While fund investors thus face a 5%
loss at the beginning of their investment, fund management does not generally charge
for the redemption of fund shares (i.e., deferred load).
Table 3.1 shows the average monthly trading volume of fund shares as a percent of
overall fund size. Distressed funds exhibit on average considerably higher monthly trading
volume of about 0.20% of respective fund size compared to the remaining open-end real
estate funds, which average about 0.02%.
To summarize, the trading volume of both distressed and healthy open-end real estate
funds is relatively low. Hence, there is no well-established secondary market for open-
end real estate fund shares in Germany. Current fund investors appear to value market
prices (i.e., discounts to NAV) as too low, while new fund investors are cautious with
their investments. The absence of a functional secondary market could be seen as a
ﬁrst indicator of investors’ potential uncertainty about the open-end fund closure and
liquidation process.
This is because a fund closure poses challenges for current investors, but opportunities
for new ones, who may be able to purchase fund shares at a considerable discount to
NAV on the secondary market. To new investors, a discount represents a hedge against
reappraisals and “ﬁre sales.” Therefore, in addition to the current trading volume of dis-
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ơƮƯƹƲ ƀŻžƇ ƜǃƲƿǃƶƲǄ ƠƲưƼƻƱƮƿǆ ƚƮƿƸƲǁ ƓǂƻƱ ƓƲƲǀ
fund Deferred Load % Initial Charge % Average Monthly Trade Volume %
AXA Immoselect 7.00 5.00 0.24
CS Eur. 0.00 5.00 0.20
DEGI Eur. 0.00 5.00 0.38
DEGI Int. 0.00 5.00 0.12
HansaImmobilia - - 0.01
KanAm grund. 0.00 5.50 0.26
MS P2 Value 0.00 5.50 -
UBS 3 Sector RE 3.00 5.50 0.10
SEB ImmoInvest 0.00 5.25 0.12
TMW Immobilien 0.00 5.00 -
DEKA Immo. Global 0.00 5.26 0.01
DEKA Immo.Fonds - - 0.01
DEKA Immo. Eur. 0.00 5.26 0.01
EURO ImmoProﬁl - - 0.01
Inter ImmoProﬁl 0.00 5.00 0.03
Grundbesitz Eur. 0.00 5.00 0.03
Grundbesitz Global 0.00 5.00 0.02
HausInvest Eur. 0.00 5.00 0.02
HausInvest Global - - 0.07
UniImmo D. 0.00 5.00 0.01
UniImmo EUR. 0.00 5.00 0.01
UniImmo Global 0.00 5.00 0.02
WestInvest 1 - - 0.02
WestInvest Inter. 0.00 5.50 0.02
The table gives an overview of the stock market fees for all distressed open-end real estate retail funds. In detail, the table displays
the deferred loan amount investors must pay if they decide to sell their shares to the management company. The third column shows
the initial charge that must be paid by investors for buying fund shares. The fourth column displays the depository bank fee. After
the liquidation period, determined by the German Financial Supervisory Authority, a depository bank assumes responsibility for any
further liquidation of fund assets. The depository bank charges a fee to the investors for the administrative expenses. For four funds,
there is no information about fund fees available due to mergers and completed liquidation processes.
tressed fund shares on the secondary market, analyzing the potential total return for new
fund investors is also a signiﬁcant part of investors’ former and current uncertainty about
distressed funds.
Due to the advanced the liquidation process, we can now calculate new investors’ overall
total returns for past fund investments. Table 3.2 gives an overview of the progress of
the liquidation process for all distressed funds using three different calculation methods:
1) the reduction in overall fund size since closure,
2) the reduction in property numbers since closure, and
3) the reduction in property asset value since closure.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the total return potential for new fund investors for all funds that
show an advanced liquidation process (i.e., a reduction in fund size of >90%). New in-
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ơƮƯƹƲ ƀŻſƇ ƙƶƾǂƶƱƮǁƶƼƻ ƝƿƼƴƿƲǀǀ ǀƶƻưƲ ƐƹƼǀǂƿƲ ƶƻ ƜưǁƼƯƲƿ ſŽŽƅ
fund name Reduction Fund size (%) Reduction no. properties (%) Reduction property assets (%) as of
AXA Immoselect 93.11 88.24 94.91 03/17
CS Eur. 68.59 73.64 76.25 02/17
SEB ImmoInvest 68.94 54.68 55.25 03/17
KanAm grund. 75.49 91.67 97.18 03/17
DEGI Int. 92.42 95.12 97.32 12/16
DEGI Eur. 91.45 100 100 09/16
UBS 3 Sector RE 89.72 83.33 97.79 03/17
TMW Immobilien 94.29 100 100 03/17
MS P2 Value 97.13 100 100 03/17
The Table displays the reductions in fund size for all distressed real estate funds, calculated as the difference in fund size from
October 2008 through March 2017. The third column shows the difference between the actual number of fund properties and the
initial number in October 2008. The fourth column shows the difference between the actual funds‘ property asset values and the
initial values in October 2008. For some funds, there is no current reporting available, so we use the latest available information.
vestors can buy fund shares with a signiﬁcant discount to NAV on the secondary market.
The graph shows the overall total return from the respective month of buying and the
current NAV from March 2017. It also considers the sum of dividend payouts while hold-
ing the shares, as well as the costs of buying. Since the funds are not fully liquidated,
there is a remaining NAV, which implies an uncertainty about the current asset worth of
the remaining real estate properties. Therefore, we calculate several scenarios: 1) The
current NAV is the market price and will be realized in the future, 2) the current NAV will
show a 25% devaluation until the end of fund liquidation, 3) the current NAV will show
a 50% devaluation until the end of fund liquidation, 4) the current NAV will show a 75%
devaluation until the end of fund liquidation, and 5) in the worst case, the current fund
shares (i.e., NAV) are worthless.
Table 3.2 shows that six funds exhibited advanced liquidations of at least 90% at the end
of the sample period in March 2017. Figure 3.1 illustrates the potential total return for
new investors for these funds. As per Equation 3.1, we can calculate the overall total
return for new investors as the difference between buying fund shares at the secondary
market price (MP) in the respective month and the current NAV value of these shares.
In addition, we consider the sum of distributed extraordinary payouts due to real estate
asset sales. As stated earlier, the purchase of fund shares is subject to a fee of 5% of
current NAV. Therefore, we subtract these initial fees from the overall total return, as well
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ƓƶƴǂƿƲ ƀŻžƇ ơƼǁƮƹ ƟƲǁǂƿƻ ƝƼǁƲƻǁƶƮƹ ƳƼƿ ƛƲǄ ƓǂƻƱ ƖƻǃƲǀǁƼƿǀ Ɩ
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as the sum of management fees (TER) charged in the respective holding period.
TR New Investorsi,t =
(MPi,t −NAVi,T ) +
∑
Div.t,T − 5% ∗NAVi,t −
∑
TERt,T
NAVi,t
(3.1)
Because the fund liquidations have continued until now, we assume that the “true” values
of the funds’ remaining real estate properties will be lower than current NAVs reported
by fund management. Hence, the remaining NAVs will face a devaluation through the
end of the liquidation process. To account for this development, we use ﬁve different
scenarios for further sales revenues, including a devaluation of the last NAV of 0% to
a maximum of 100%. Due to the advanced liquidation process, the remaining NAVs
of these six funds are relatively low and do not signiﬁcantly change overall total return.
Moreover, the assumed devaluation of the last NAV has the advantage of controlling for
potential “cherry picking” by fund management. If management chooses a liquidation
strategy, or is forced by market conditions to sell the best assets ﬁrst and the worst last,
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large devaluations of the last NAV would be appropriate.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the potential total returns for the remaining three funds, which are
less than 90% through the liquidation process. Due to the signiﬁcant extent of the re-
maining NAVs, the results differ substantially across the various devaluation scenarios.
All three funds show predominantly positive total returns for new fund investors over the
2012-2014 period in the case of a maximum 25% current NAV devaluation. However,
higher devaluations would lead to signiﬁcant losses for new investors in the same period.
The advancing liquidation process, associated with lower NAVs, will increase the validity
of the total return potential for these three funds in the future.
Figure 3.1 shows that new fund investors who bought their shares on the secondary
market and held them until March 2017 obtained signiﬁcantly positive returns for all
scenarios during the time of the largest discounts to NAV (2012 through 2014). Therefore,
from an ex post perspective, these large discounts to NAV were excessive.
ƓƶƴǂƿƲ ƀŻſƇ ơƼǁƮƹ ƟƲǁǂƿƻ ƝƼǁƲƻǁƶƮƹ ƳƼƿ ƛƲǄ ƓǂƻƱ ƖƻǃƲǀǁƼƿǀ ƖƖ
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The Figure illustrates the total return potential for new fund investors for funds that are not in the ﬁnal stage of liquidation (i.e., a
reduction in fund size of <90%).
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To summarize, we observe indicators of high uncertainty about fund liquidation itself, and
about funds’ former and current real estate property valuations.
In addition to the analysis of the secondary market for open-end fund shares, identifying
the inﬂuential factors of fund performance could help diminish the prevailing uncertainty
about the liquidation process of distressed German open-end real estate funds.
ƀŻƀ ƟƲƹƮǁƲƱ ƙƶǁƲƿƮǁǂƿƲ ƮƻƱ ƕǆƽƼǁƵƲǀƲǀ
We use the literature on performance studies for mutual funds, REITs and open-end real
estate funds to derive the inﬂuential factors on fund performance for open-end real estate
funds.
ƀŻƀŻž ƒưƼƻƼƺƶƲǀ ƼƳ ƠưƮƹƲ ƮƻƱ ƠưƼƽƲ
First, we use fund size, age and the existence of a bank-owned distribution network for
fund shares as proxies for the economies of scale and scope that affect fund performance.
Fund size is used in a vast array of research as an explanatory variable affecting fund
performance. According to Morri and Lee (2009), larger Italian real estate mutual funds
achieve better performance due to economies of scale. This is because larger funds can
diversify their administrative expenses over several real estate assets. In contrast, Ferreira
et al. (2013) mention that growing funds are constantly forced to ﬁnd new productive
investment projects, which generally increases risk of mistaken purchases. Grinblatt and
Titman (1994) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between fund size and performance in their
study on U.S. mutual funds over the 1974-1984 period. Although the current results are
ambivalent, we expect larger funds to exhibit better performance due to economies of
scale and scope.
Company age is also considered as an explanatory factor in fund performance. Morri
and Lee (2009) illustrate that investment inexperience and initial costs can signiﬁcantly
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diminish the performance of younger funds. In contrast, Otten and Bams (2002), and
Ferreira et al. (2013) ﬁnd that newly issued funds perform better than more experienced
ones. We include fund age as a proxy for economies of scale and scope, and expect that
older funds will perform better.
Furthermore, one-third of all the open-end real estate funds considered here sell their
fund shares via the distribution networks of their respective owners (i.e., banks).6 There-
fore, these funds have a more diversiﬁed customer target group (i.e., greater economies
of scope) than those without such a channel. Hence, we include a dummy variable to
indicate whether the fund is sold via a bank-owned distribution network. The potential
inﬂuence of economies of scale and scope form our ﬁrst hypothesis:
ƕǆƽƼǁƵƲǀƶǀ žƇ ƓǂƻƱ ƽƲƿƳƼƿƺƮƻưƲ ƶƻưƿƲƮǀƲǀ ǄƶǁƵ ƴƿƲƮǁƲƿ ƲưƼƻƼƺƶƲǀ ƼƳ ǀưƮƹƲ ƮƻƱ ǀưƼƽƲ.
ƀŻƀŻſ ƓǂƻƱ ƚƮƻƮƴƲƺƲƻǁ ƠƸƶƹƹǀ
Next, we focus on the inﬂuence of fund management skills on fund performance. Ac-
cording to Ippolito (1989), higher fund fees are an indicator of high management quality
and lead to better fund performance. Morri and Lee (2009) also ﬁnd a positive inﬂu-
ence of management fees on fund performance. However, in contrast, Carhart (1997)
ﬁnd that higher fees tend to diminish performance. Wermers (2000), in his study of U.S.
equity mutual funds over the 1975-1994 period, ﬁnd that fund managers are generally
able to outperform the market. Nevertheless, these actively managed funds have lower
net returns for investors than passively managed funds after considering expense ratios
and transaction costs. According to Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009), U.S. equity mutual
funds, which tend to exhibit low gross fund performance overall, impose higher manage-
ment fees. One explanation for this may be that fund management believes current fund
investors are less sensitive to poor performance, and they can thus impose higher fees.
To summarize, the inﬂuence of management fees is ambivalent. We use funds’ total ex-
pense ratios as a proxy for fund management ability, and expect an increasing inﬂuence
6Hausinvest funds, DEGI funds, Grundbesitz funds, DEKA funds.
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on fund performance.
Note that the regional and sectoral focus of fund management serves as an indicator of
fund management skills. Morri and Lee (2009) ﬁnd considerable inﬂuence of property
type diversiﬁcation on Italian open-end fund performance. Nevertheless, the authors
found no evidence of any inﬂuence of country investment share on fund performance.
Gallo et al. (2000), for the 1991-1997 period, note that U.S. mutual real estate funds
perform better if fund management constructs a more diversiﬁed portfolio consisting of
several property types.
Ferreira et al. (2013) show that funds can obtain higher returns by focusing their country
investments on well-evolved economies that are also located close to their homemarkets.
Moreover, Kurzrock et al. (2009), in their performance analysis of German open-end real
estate funds from 2005 to 2007, show that funds with a stronger international invest-
ment focus exhibit additional transnational administrative costs that ultimately lessen fund
performance.
Therefore, we include funds’ target market index returns, weighted by portfolio country
share, as an additional inﬂuential variable for management ability. This variable represents
the management choice for regional diversiﬁcation. It shows the market timing ability of
fund management and controls for the development of funds’ real estate investment
markets. We also use the Herﬁndahl index for sectoral concentration of funds’ real estate
portfolios as a proxy for fund management’s strategy to either specialize or diversify.
Subsequent to the liquidation announcement, funds are required to sell all real estate as-
sets within three to ﬁve years. Afterward, they are forced by law to transfer management
to a depository bank, which is now in charge of selling the remaining properties. There-
fore, funds can have two different managements over time. We use a dummy variable to
distinguish between the two, which enables us to further control for fund management
ability. Our second hypothesis focuses on the impacts of fund management skill on fund
performance:
ƕǆƽƼǁƵƲǀƶǀ ſƇ ƓǂƻƱ ƽƲƿƳƼƿƺƮƻưƲ ƶƻưƿƲƮǀƲǀ ǄƶǁƵ ƶƻưƿƲƮǀƶƻƴ ƳǂƻƱ ƺƮƻƮƴƲƺƲƻǁ ƮƯƶƹƶǁǆ.
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ƀŻƀŻƀ ƜƽƲƻźƒƻƱ ƓǂƻƱ ƠǁƮǁǂǀ
The closure and liquidation of an open-end real estate fund force fund management to
sell the entire real estate portfolio. However, distressed funds face different time con-
straints. First, there is a maximum closure period of twenty-four months , after which
the initial fund management will be forced to sell the entire portfolio within three to
ﬁve years. Hence, potential buyers of real estate properties are aware of distressed fund
managements’ time pressure, which could lead to “ﬁre sales” due to a loss in bargain-
ing power. The distressed status itself could also affect fund performance, because the
forced sale of an entire portfolio could reveal existing overvaluations of the real estate
fund assets. Such overvaluations could be caused by appraisers’ misjudgments, or by
smoothing effects due to the standard appraisal methods.
This asset overpricing thus emerges before the fund closure, and could theoretically be
present for distressed, and healthy open-end real estate funds. Hence, negative reap-
praisals of the real estate portfolio may become necessary for all open-end real estate
funds during times of future fund closures. We use funds’ distressed status to control for
a loss in bargaining power due to the legally mandated time constraint in the selling pro-
cess, as well as for potentially imminent overvaluations caused by the common appraisal
methods in the NAV calculation.
After controlling for these effects, the considerable discount to NAV on the secondary
markets for fund shares further illustrates the extent of investor mistrust in current funds’
real estate asset valuations. The lack of trust in the valuation methods arises ﬁrst after
closure, primarily because fund investors were able to sell their shares to guaranteed NAV
by fund management prior to closure. Using the distressed status dummy variable, we
control for existing overvaluations, whereas the discount to NAV is considered as the
market expectation of the real estate asset values and can be rational and/or irrational. If
the capital markets consider the real estate assets too expensive, potential buyers could
use that against fund management in the selling process. Thus, existing high discounts
to NAV also tend to lower fund managements’ efforts in the liquidation process because
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of a loss in their bargaining power.
The discounts to NAV also serve as a measure of the pressure on fund management. Cur-
rent fund investors face considerably lower market prices for their fund shares, as well
as greater uncertainty about their actual losses at the end of the liquidation process. In
addition, the entire liquidation process lasts for several years. Therefore, fund investors
often accuse fund management of mismanagement. As a consequence, fund manage-
ment may prefer short-term over long-term sales revenue by selling the best real estate
assets ﬁrst at no or little discount (i.e., “cherry picking”), and distributing the earnings to
investors in order to alleviate current pressure. However, this strategy could also increase
current discounts to NAV. Fund investors may try to exit the fund before the remaining
inferior real estate assets are sold, which could lead to further negative devaluations of
NAV, and signiﬁcant losses for current fund investors. Because almost no fund man-
agers were able to sell all real estate assets by the end of the determined liquidation
period, the management of funds was transferred to a depository bank, which is now in
charge of selling the remaining properties. Therefore, short-term sales revenues could be
a preferable strategy for initial fund management, as further negative reappraisals of the
remaining assets would be realized under the responsibility of the depository bank.
We analyze whether distressed funds perform worse than the remaining healthy funds
due to current discounts to NAV on the secondary market and to the stigma of failure.
This leads to our third hypothesis:
ƕǆƽƼǁƵƲǀƶǀ ƀƇ ƓǂƻƱǀ’ ƱƶǀưƼǂƻǁǀ ǁƼ ƛƎƣ ƹƼǄƲƿ ƳǂƻƱ ƽƲƿƳƼƿƺƮƻưƲ
ƀŻƀŻƁ ƐƼƻǁƿƼƹ VƮƿƶƮƯƹƲǀ
A fund’s liquidity ratio serves as a further fund-speciﬁc control variable. Interest rates for
cash and money market deposits are historically low. Therefore, larger cash reserves are
associated with lower fund performance. Downs et al. (2016) ﬁnd evidence that the risk
of a liquidity shortage signiﬁcantly affects the ﬂow-performance relationship of open-end
real estate funds.
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We use funds’ leverage ratios as an additional control variable affecting fund perfor-
mance.
Warther (1995) studies U.S. mutual funds over the 1984-1993 period, and ﬁnds that fund
ﬂows have a signiﬁcantly positive effect on subsequent fund performance on a macro
level. However, in contrast, Frazzini and Lamont (2008) study mutual funds over the
1980-2003 period, and ﬁnd that past fund ﬂows serve as a proxy for investor sentiment
and decrease subsequent fund returns. We include the lagged funds’ capital ﬂows to
control for the ﬂow-performance relationship.
ƀŻƁ ƑƮǁƮŹ ƚƲǁƵƼƱƼƹƼƴǆ ƮƻƱ ƠƮƺƽƹƲ ƑƲǀưƿƶƽǁƶƼƻ
ƀŻƁŻž ƑƮǁƮ ƠƼǂƿưƲǀ
Our monthly panel model dataset consists of twenty-four open-end real estate funds
from August 2002 through March 2017. The dataset includes the statistical population
of German open-end real estate retail funds. It begins in August 2002 (because ﬁve funds
were issued after that time). In addition, a signiﬁcant change in the investment law was
announced in January 2002. We obtain fund-speciﬁc variables from funds’ monthly fact
sheets and from published half-year and annual reports. The data on capital inﬂows come
from the German Investment and Asset Management Association (BVI), which represents
the vast majority of the German mutual fund industry. Market prices are provided by
the Hamburg-Hannover stock exchange. EPRA/NAREIT provide the growth of the funds’
target real estate markets.
ƀŻƁŻſ ƟƲǀƲƮƿưƵ ƑƲǀƶƴƻ ƮƻƱ VƮƿƶƮƯƹƲ ƑƲﬁƻƶǁƶƼƻǀ
Our dependent variable is the Sharpe ratio (the risk-adjusted total return) of fund i at
the end of month t. According to Morri and Lee (2009), the standard deviation is the
preferable risk measure for Italian real estate mutual funds because most fund investors
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invest in only a single fund. Standard deviation allows us to control for unsystematic, as
well as systematic, risk.7 Therefore, we use the Sharpe ratio as a suitable proxy for fund
performance, because investors in open-end real estate are mainly retail investors without
diversiﬁed fund investment strategies. We estimate the following panel regression model:
Sharpe Ratioi,t = α + β1∆ ln Fundsizei,t−1 + β2 ln Agei,t
+ β3 Sale by banki,t + β4 TERi,t−1
+ β5 Individual EPRA IRi,t + β6 HHI Portfolioi,t
+ β7 Depository Banki,t
+ β8 Distressi,t−1 + β9 Discount to NAVi,t−1
+ β10∆ Leveragei,t−1 + β11 Liquidityi,t−1 + β12 Fund F lowsi,t−1
+ vi,t
(3.2)
Our panel regression model is estimated with heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-
robust clustered standard errors (i.e., Huber-White sandwich estimator).8
The fact sheets provided by fund management are published with a time lag, so the
fund-speciﬁc variables fund size and TER are one month behind. The discount to NAV,
the distressed status dummy variable, the leverage ratio, the liquidity ratio and fund ﬂows
also exhibit a one-month lag in the model framework. The variables age, sale by bank,
Herﬁndahl index and depository bank dummy variable are included with no lag, since
these status variables exhibit less volatility over time. A part of the real estate portfolio is
reappraised each month. Therefore, we expect that considerable changes in the monthly
fund target markets index returns will affect the respective fund performance within one
month. Hence, we include the Individual EPRA/NAREIT country index return variable with
no lag. In addition, we use the ﬁrst difference of fund size and leverage (∆) to obtain
stationarity for all variables.
7Redman and Manakyan (1995), Ooi and Liow (2004).
8In addition, we use an IV and a GMM estimator for HAC standard errors as provided by Schaffer (2010) to
validate the results of our preferred Huber-White sandwich estimator. The Schaffer method conﬁrms our
results.
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The ƠƵƮƿƽƲ ƟƮǁƶƼ represents the annual risk-adjusted fund performance. First, we calcu-
late total return by taking the percentage change in monthly net asset value. We also
consider the dividend payments distributed to investors. Next, we subtract the risk-free
twelve-month EURIBOR interest rate from the total return, and divide the results by the
individual fund’s standard deviation.
ƓǂƻƱ ǀƶǇƲ represents the absolute difference in the logarithm of fund size, measured in
EUR 100 million.
ƹƻ ƎƴƲ is the logarithmic fund age in months.
ƠƮƹƲ Ưǆ ƯƮƻƸ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a fund uses a bank-owned distribution
network.
ơƒƟ shows the fund management costs proportional to the respective fund size.
ƖƻƱƶǃƶƱǂƮƹ ƒPƟƎ ƖƟ is the weighted monthly index return of the fund’s real estate target
markets provided by EPRA/NAREIT. In detail, the monthly index returns of the particular
fund target markets are weighted with the country investment share of the overall fund
portfolio.
ƕƕƖ PƼƿǁƳƼƹƶƼ denotes the fund’s sectoral focus as represented by the Herﬁndahl concen-
tration in office, retail, hotel and residential investments.
ƑƲƽƼǀƶǁƼƿǆ ƏƮƻƸ is a 0/1 indicator variable that equals 1 if the fund is managed by a
depository bank.
ƑƶǀǁƿƲǀǀ is a 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is closed or under liquidation.
ƑƶǀưƼǂƻǁ ǁƼ ƛƎƣ is calculated as the percentage between the current stock market price
and the respective Net Asset Value of the fund shares.
ƙƲǃƲƿƮƴƲ denotes the absolute difference in the percentage between debt and gross asset
value.
ƙƶƾǂƶƱƶǁǆ is the liquidity ratio, which consists of the percentage between fund cash and
gross asset value.
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ƖƻƱƶǃƶƱǂƮƹ ƓǂƻƱ ƓƹƼǄǀ shows the fund’s capital ﬂows, which are calculated as the monthly
change in net capital ﬂows compared to the respective fund size.
ƀŻƁŻƀ ƑƲǀưƿƶƽǁƶǃƲ ƠǁƮǁƶǀǁƶưǀ
Table 3.3 provides an overview of the summary statistics for all variables.
ơƮƯƹƲ ƀŻƀƇ ƜǃƲƿǃƶƲǄ ƠǂƺƺƮƿǆ ƠǁƮǁƶǀǁƶưǀ
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs
Sharpe Ratio -0.051 1.146 -4.867 4.454 3261
Total Return 0.006 0.069 -0.452 0.489 3262
Fund size 36.76 32.238 0.46 144.388 3566
Age 241.639 168.546 25 608 3879
Sale by bank 0.34 0.474 0 1 3872
TER 0.008 0.003 0 0.015 3217
Individual EPRA IR 0.005 0.05 -0.274 0.387 3519
HHI Portfolio 0.539 0.129 0.21 0.914 3247
Depository Bank 0.051 0.219 0 1 3966
Distress 0.225 0.418 0 1 3919
Discount to NAV 0.061 0.127 -0.021 0.598 3696
Leverage 0.21 0.123 0 0.690 3469
Liquidity 0.251 0.135 0.003 0.997 3492
Fund Flows 0.002 0.035 -0.566 0.77 3373
The Table provides an overview of the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum and the number of observations for all
variables.
The average annual total return is 0.6%. According to Table 3.3, the MS P2 value fund
has the lowest annual total return of -45.2%, while the Inter ImmoProﬁl fund exhibits
an annual total return of +48.9%. Figure 3.3 shows a signiﬁcantly negative average
total return for open-end real estate funds over the October 2008-January 2014 period.
The subsequent average total return exhibits considerable positive development through
March 2017.
Fund size ranges from a minimum of EUR 46 million to a maximum of EUR 14.43 billion,
with an average of EUR 3.67 billion. The Deka Immobilien Europa fund is the largest, while
the UBS 3 sector Real Estate fund has a minimum of EUR 46 million as of March 2017.
57
3. Analyzing the Performance of German Open-End Real Estate Funds
ƓƶƴǂƿƲ ƀŻƀƇ ƠǂƺƺƮƿǆ ƠǁƮǁƶǀǁƶưǀ
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The Figure illustrates the average progression of the dependent and independent variables from 2002:8 through 2017:3.
Although distressed funds shrink due to the liquidation of their real estate portfolios,
the remaining funds were able to expand due to the increasing demand for fund shares.
According to Figure 3.3, average fund size has increased since 2011, from EUR 3 billion
to about EUR 4 billion as of March 2017.
The mean of the sales by bank dummy variable of 0.34 shows that 34% of all open-end
funds use a bank-owned distribution network to sell their fund shares, since almost no
fund changed its distribution network over time.
And funds’ expense ratios ranged from 0% to 1.5% of average annual fund size, with an
average of 0.8%. The SEB Immoinvest fund had a total expense ratio of 0% from August
2002 through March 2004. Figure 3.3 illustrates that the average total expense ratio
increases signiﬁcantly over time, from 0.75% in 2008 to 0.9% at the end of our sample
period.
As the Individual EPRA Index return shows, the funds’ weighted target markets on aver-
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age exhibit a monthly index return of 0.5%. The Euro Immo Proﬁl fund had the lowest
weighted target market return of -27.4% at the height of the global ﬁnancial crisis in
October 2008. After an additional large negative return in November 2008, the Ger-
man EPRA/NAREIT real estate index, which represents the main investment market for
the Euro Immo Proﬁl fund, began a signiﬁcant recovery, however. Therefore, the Euro
Immo Proﬁl fund also showed the largest positive development in its target market return
of +38.7%. This high volatility illustrates the considerable uncertainty about the impact
of the ﬁnancial crisis on the real estate markets in October 2008 and the subsequent time
period. According to Figure 3.3, open-end real estate funds on average have exhibited
predominantly positive development of their target market returns since 2010. This is es-
pecially noteworthy when compared to the large negative index returns during the global
ﬁnancial crisis.
The HHI Portfolio variable on average shows a sectoral concentration of 0.54. Open-
end funds mainly invest in office buildings. According to Figure 3.3, the average sectoral
concentration for open-end real estate funds has increased substantially, from 0.47 to
almost 0.55 since the beginning of 2013.
Moreover, because fully half of all the open-end real estate funds considered here are
still open, thus showing a discount to NAV of 0%, the interpretation of the overall mean
across funds and time is biased. Figure 3.3 shows that the average discount to NAV of
almost 20% in 2013 had decreased dramatically to about 10% by the end of the sample
period. Without the remaining healthy funds, the average discounts would thus be about
twice as high.
The leverage ratio exhibits high heterogeneity. At the end of the sample period, ﬁve
distressed funds exhibited leverage ratios of zero, with an average across all funds and
time of 21%. Furthermore, we detect lower leverage ratios over time because distressed
funds repay their property-associated loans according to the advanced fund liquidation.
The TMW Immobilien Welt fund had a 0.3% cash reserve in May 2016, despite the fact
that open-end real estate funds are required to hold cash reserves of at least 5% of real
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estate property values. A lower liquidity ratio is only valid for a short period of time. Five
funds opened after August 2002, and, therefore, had liquidity ratios of almost 100%,
since their capital was not invested in real estate. Hence, we include these funds only after
twenty-four months of existence. However, note that the liquidity ratios also signiﬁcantly
increased after 2012 due to the progressing liquidation of ten of the funds in the dataset,
which were forced to sell their entire real estate portfolios and return the earnings to
investors. Thus, the distressed DEGI Europa fund had a maximum liquidity ratio of 99.7%
in September 2016 because the fund had sold all of its real estate assets.
The funds’ average capital net ﬂows are 0.2%. Newly issued funds tend to have unusually
high capital inﬂows when they ﬁrst open. This is another reason we exclude the ﬁrst years
of a fund’s existence. In addition, fundmergers can lead to tremendous changes in capital
ﬂows. Hence, we exclude these special events from our dataset (n=5).
Table 3.4 illustrates the cross-correlation between all variables. The Sharpe ratios exhibit a
signiﬁcantly negative correlation with the discount to NAV of -0.47 and with the dummy
variable indicator for the distress status of -0.42. This could be an indicator of endo-
geneity if the worst-performing funds ultimately close, and, therefore, also exhibit poor
performance during the closure periods. Nevertheless, according to Table 3.5, the aver-
age performance of currently distressed funds during the pre-crisis period from August
2002 to September 2008 was 4.6%, compared to 3.0% on average for the remaining
healthy funds. Therefore, distressed funds were not the worst-performing open-end real
estate funds during the pre-crisis period.
On the other hand, closed funds may have overvalued their real estate portfolios to gener-
ate excess total returns and attract new fund investors. This may be why investors seem
to have less trust in these “exceptional” well-performing funds during times of market
turmoil. Overvaluations could lead to large share redemptions and even to fund closures.
Nevertheless, the differences in pre-crisis performance are relatively low. Hence, it seems
that the closed funds are neither the worst-performing nor the most overvalued in their
real estate portfolios. There is thus no evidence of endogeneity.
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ơƮƯƹƲ ƀŻƂƇ ƝƿƲźƐƿƶǀƶǀ ƝƲƿƶƼƱƇ ƕƲƮƹǁƵǆ ǃǀŻ ƑƶǀǁƿƲǀǀƲƱ ƓǂƻƱǀ
Mean Healthy Mean Distressed
Sharpe Ratio -0.197 0.192
Total Return 0.030 0.046
Fundsize 39.934 30.144
Age 244.508 149.547
Sale by bank 0.454 0.267
TER 0.006 0.008
Individual EPRA IR 0.001 -0.001
HHI Portfolio 0.563 0.617
Leverage 0.190 0.238
Liquidity 0.282 0.316
Fund Flows -0.001 0.015
The Table shows the pre-crisis (August 2002-September 2008) comparison between healthy funds and funds subsequently closed
and/or liquidated.
Table 3.5 compares all the explanatory variables for healthy and distressed funds dur-
ing the pre-crisis period from August 2002 through September 2008. Funds that subse-
quently closed exhibited lower average fund size, were younger, and had higher manage-
ment fees and higher leverage ratios. They were also less likely than healthy funds to have
a bank-owned distribution network. However, to the contrary, they showed on average
larger liquidity ratios, as well as larger capital inﬂows. Considering all the explanatory
variables, there is no further evidence that the distressed funds actually performed worse
than the healthy funds on average, since the differences in most explanatory variables
were not severe.
In addition, the dummy variable for distress status and the discount to NAV show a strong
positive correlation of +0.87. Without the distress status, there is no discount to NAV.
Nevertheless, we observe premia to NAV for distressed funds, which explains the absence
of a perfectly positive correlation. The discount to NAV and the depository bank dummy
variable also show a signiﬁcant positive correlation of about +0.35. Fund management is
typically transferred to the depository bank after the liquidation period. This is considered
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by law to be a sale of the entire real estate portfolio, which leads to additional taxes for
fund investors. Thus, this should increase discounts to NAV.
ƀŻƂ ƟƲǀǂƹǁǀ
Table 3.6 shows the results of our regression model speciﬁcations (I-III). The ﬁrst model
includes the indicators for economies of scale and scope represented by fund size, age
and the dummy variable for the existence of a bank-owned distribution network (I). The
second model adds the inﬂuential factors for fund management ability, represented by
the total expense ratio, the individual EPRA index return, sectoral concentration and a
control variable for the potential inﬂuence of a fund management change (II). The third
model displays two further indicator variables for the inﬂuence of a fund’s distress status
on fund performance. All three model speciﬁcations also control for the leverage ratio,
the liquidity ratio and the fund’s capital net ﬂows.9 Our preferred model, III, has 2,722
observations and exhibits a 22.3% goodness of ﬁt.
ƀŻƂŻž ƒưƼƻƼƺƶƲǀ ƼƳ ƠưƮƹƲ ƮƻƱ ƠưƼƽƲ
First, we test the potential inﬂuence of economies of scale and scope on fund perfor-
mance (Hypothesis 1). Fund size shows a stable, increasing and signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
funds’ Sharpe ratios (models I, II and III). Considering the logarithm, recalculating the re-
gression coefficients shows that an increase in the absolute difference of fund size by EUR
100 million would lead on average and c.p. one month later to an increase in the Sharpe
ratio by 1.395%. The positive inﬂuence indicates that larger funds are able to realize
large-scale real estate investments and use economies of scale in their administration.
Next, we use fund age as a further proxy for economies of scale and scope. The regres-
sion results are not stable across our different model speciﬁcations. Nevertheless, our
9The legal fund environment (i.e., selling restrictions on the real estate properties) shows no signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on fund performance.
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ơƮƯƹƲ ƀŻƃƇ ƒǅƽƹƮƶƻƶƻƴ ƓǂƻƱǀ‘ ƠƵƮƿƽƲ ƟƮǁƶƼǀ (ƶŻƲŻŹ ƟƶǀƸźƮƱƷǂǀǁƲƱ ơƼǁƮƹ ƟƲǁǂƿƻǀ)
(I) (II) (III)
∆ ln Fund sizei,t−1 1.523*** 1.649*** 1.395***
(0.383) (0.506) (0.384)
ln agei,t -0.200 -0.184 0.524**
(0.269) (0.356) (0.242)
Sale by banki,t 0.874*** 0.767*** -0.167
(0.210) (0.243) (0.133)
TERi,t−1 6.902 14.76
(41.14) (32.08)
Individual EPRA IRi,t 0.833* 1.114**
(0.476) (0.449)
HHI Portfolioi,t 1.036 0.714
(0.827) (0.582)
Depository Banki,t -0.226 -0.164
(0.236) (0.259)
Distressi,t−1 -0.326**
(0.141)
Discount to NAVi,t−1 -4.023***
(0.383)
∆ Leveragei,t−1 0.413 0.178 -0.992
(0.716) (0.994) (0.774)
Liquidityi,t−1 0.0327 -0.0164 -0.766*
(0.416) (0.506) (0.414)
Fund Flowsi,t−1 0.900 0.687 0.426
(0.783) (0.903) (0.805)
Constant 0.673 0.113 -2.606*
(1.438) (2.079) (1.440)
Observations 3,119 2,723 2,722
R-squared 0.046 0.063 0.223
Number of funds 24 24 24
The Table displays the results of the performance regression. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance
as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
preferred model (III) shows a positive and signiﬁcant inﬂuence of age on risk-adjusted
fund performance. A 1% increase in fund age exhibits on average and c.p. a 0.524%
higher Sharpe ratio. Therefore, we ﬁnd that fund age can proxy for the inﬂuence of the
economics of scale and scope on fund performance. Older funds seem to have developed
more efficient administration than newly issued funds.
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We next test the inﬂuence of a fund’s bank-owned distribution network for fund shares
on performance. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect in our preferred model (III). But we ﬁnd
a positive and signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the sale by bank variable on fund performance in
models I and II. The active advertisement of fund shares by fund sponsors (i.e., large
German banks), and the positive diversiﬁcation effect of the wide target group of bank
customers, should theoretically enhance fund performance. Nevertheless, we cannot
conﬁrm a positive or signiﬁcant inﬂuence of a bank-owned distribution network as a
proxy for economies of scale and scope on fund performance.
To summarize, we ﬁnd predominantly positive effects of economies of scale and scope
on fund performance.
ƀŻƂŻſ ƓǂƻƱ ƚƮƻƮƴƲƺƲƻǁ ƠƸƶƹƹǀ
We test for the inﬂuence of fund management ability on fund performance (Hypothesis
2). First, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the total expense ratio on subsequent fund
performance. On the one hand, higher management fees decrease overall fund perfor-
mance; on the other hand, they could signal fund management quality. The reason for
the insigniﬁcance of the total expense ratios could be that management fees are relatively
stable across time.
Fund management target market mix, represented by the weighted funds’ target market
monthly index return, shows a stable and signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence on fund perfor-
mance in model II, as well as in our preferred model, III. Funds with a 1% higher target
market index return exhibit on average and c.p. a signiﬁcantly higher subsequent Sharpe
ratio of about 1.114%. A well-chosen target market mix serves as an indicator of fund
management ability, although it is possible that fund managers could invest in poor-
performing real estate assets even in a high-performing real estate market environment.
Note that the level of specialization or diversiﬁcation depends on fund management strat-
egy. Hence, we can use the level of concentration as an additional proxy for fund man-
agement skill. Nevertheless, our proxy variable, the Herﬁndahl index for sectoral concen-
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tration (HHI portfolio), shows a positive but insigniﬁcant inﬂuence on fund performance.
Funds, which invest mainly in one asset class are more specialized and should be able to
obtain better investment choices. On the contrary, specialization causes less diversiﬁca-
tion, which lead to higher risk.
As we noted earlier, distressed funds by law must transfer management to a depository
bank if they are not able to sell their entire real estate portfolios during the determined liq-
uidation time period. As of March 2017, we ﬁnd that a plethora of funds have been man-
aged by depository banks for several years. Therefore, it is feasible to test the inﬂuence
of a management change as a proxy for fund management ability on fund performance.
Both model speciﬁcations show a negative but insigniﬁcant inﬂuence of a management
change on fund performance.
Besides the signiﬁcant inﬂuence of target market mix, we ﬁnd that management fees,
sectoral concentration and the inﬂuence of a different fund management have no sig-
niﬁcant inﬂuence on fund performance. Considering several proxies for management
ability, we are in line with the literature on performance studies that shows the inﬂuence
of management ability on fund performance is not clear. These results strengthen the
theory that external factors, besides fund management skill and economies of scale and
scope, considerably affect the performance of open-end real estate funds, and especially
of distressed funds.
ƀŻƂŻƀ ƜƽƲƻźƒƻƱ ƓǂƻƱ ƠǁƮǁǂǀ
According to Hypothesis 3, we can use the discount to NAV as an additional inﬂuential
variable on fund performance. We can also use a fund’s distress status variable to control
for the inﬂuence of the time constraint in the liquidation process, as well as for potential
asset overvaluations due to the calculation of funds’ net asset values. The lagged dummy
variable for distress status shows a signiﬁcantly negative inﬂuence on subsequent fund
performance (model III). A distressed fund exhibits c.p. a 0.326-point lower subsequent
Sharpe ratio. Hence, the distress status itself lowers fund performance. This effect may be
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attributable to the loss in bargaining power in the real estate sales process from the man-
dated time constraint for the entire fund liquidation. Moreover, distressed funds seem to
exhibit signiﬁcant asset overvaluations caused by the appraisal methodology. These over-
valuations were revealed by the closure and the forced real estate asset liquidation. The
extent of fund investors’ mistrust in the appraisal methods is represented by the discount
to NAV. In addition to existing overvaluations, excessive discounts to NAVmay also be due
to fund investors’ uncertainty over the liquidation process and irrational inﬂuences. The
discount to NAV measures the loss in bargaining power of fund management because of
the lower real estate asset valuations by market participants. In addition, dissatisﬁed fund
investors may increase selling pressure by suing the fund for mismanagement. Therefore,
the discount to NAV also measures the extent of this pressure by fund investors. In line
with this theory, we note that a 1% higher discount to NAV leads on average and c.p. to
a 4.023% lower Sharpe ratio in the subsequent month.
ƀŻƂŻƁ ƐƼƻǁƿƼƹ VƮƿƶƮƯƹƲǀ
We control for the liquidity ratio, the leverage ratio and funds’ capital net ﬂows across
all model speciﬁcations. The liquidity ratio signiﬁcantly inﬂuences fund performance, but
the leverage ratio and the fund ﬂows do not. These results hold across all model speciﬁ-
cations.
A 1% increase in the liquidity ratio decreases c.p. and on average the fund’s subsequent
Sharpe ratio in our preferred model (III) by 0.766%. The capital held in money market
deposits and cash could not be invested in real estate assets. Since liquidity shows a lower
interest yield than real estate, funds with higher liquidity ratios display lower overall fund
performance. Nevertheless, better performance comes at the cost of higher risk for the
real estate investment compared to the relatively safe money market deposits.
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ƀŻƃ ƐƼƻưƹǂǀƶƼƻ
This study contributes to the literature on performance studies for mutual funds, as well
as to that on open-end real estate funds in general. Due to the advanced liquidation
process of distressed funds, it is now feasible to analyze the secondary market conditions
for distressed fund shares. We show that the tremendous discounts to NAV for distressed
funds during the 2012-2014 period were too high. The uncertainty about the liquidation
process may have motivated exaggerated discounts to NAV of up to 60%.
We also ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative inﬂuence of the discount to NAV on fund perfor-
mance. Overly large discounts can be considered a measure of uncertainty about current
valuation methods and about the liquidation process. Signiﬁcant discounts also put pres-
sure on fund management, and, therefore, lead to a loss in bargaining power during the
sales process.
But the distress status itself also lowers fund performance. Because distressed open-end
real estate funds were not the worst-performing funds prior to their closure, the fund
closure events reveal serious overvaluations of funds’ real estate assets. This could theo-
retically also be a problem for the remaining healthy open-end real estate funds. More-
over, the time constraint for fund liquidation can lower fund management’s bargaining
power. Ultimately, we ﬁnd that fund performance depends on economies of scale and
scope (i.e., fund size and age), as well as on the development of funds’ target real estate
markets.
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ơƵƲ ƑƶǀưƼǂƻǁ ǁƼ ƛƎV ƼƳ ƑƶǀǁƿƲǀǀƲƱ
ƟƲƮƹ ƒǀǁƮǁƲ ƓǂƻƱǀ
This study is the result of a joint project with Michael Heinrich, René-Ojas
Woltering, and Steffen Sebastian
ƁŻž ƖƻǁƿƼƱǂưǁƶƼƻ
Open-end real estate funds, besides REITs and closed-end funds, represent one of the
most signiﬁcant real estate investment vehicles worldwide1, with Germany being the
largest market. As of December 2016, this asset class had investments totalling about
EUR 145 billion.
Investors in these funds trade directly with the fund or its sponsor, which sells and redeems
shares on a regular basis. Price per share is determined by the sponsor, and is based
on the market value of all assets and liabilities. Each month, independent appraisers
reappraise one-twelfth of the entire portfolio.2 Due to their NAV-based pricing system,
open-end real estate funds are usually less volatile than REITs or real estate stocks, which
are subject to stock market risk. This, however, comes at the cost of increased liquidity
1See Downs et al. (2017) for a recent overview.
2See Weistroffer and Sebastian (2015) and Fecht and Wedow (2014).
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risk. The discrepancy between the daily liquidity of fund shares and the illiquidity of the
underlying direct property investments is referred to as “bank run” risk (Bannier et al.,
2008; Weistroffer and Sebastian, 2015). To maintain the “buy-back” guarantee, open-
end real estate funds tend to hold high cash reserves. In Germany, at least 5% of a fund’s
NAV must be held in cash or liquid assets. In practice, average liquidity ratios tend to
ﬂuctuate between 20% and 30% (see Downs et al. (2017)), although these reserves may
prove inadequate during times of market turmoil.
A recent example of what havoc market turmoil can wreak can be seen with the Brexit
referendum in the U.K. on June 23, 2016. The decision to leave the European Union came
as a surprise to many investors, and led to massive redemptions from U.K. open-end real
estate funds. As a result, seven public U.K. funds, representing half the total open-end
real estate fund assets under management, were forced to suspend share redemptions.3
However, the German open-end fund industry was hit even harder in the aftermath of
the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis. Starting in October 2008, the month after the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy, ten public German open-end real estate funds had to suspend share
redemptions.4 None of these funds could raise enough liquidity to permanently stay open
and fulﬁll all the redemption requests. Thus, each one had to liquidate its portfolio and
pay out the proceeds to investors.5
Besides waiting for the stepwise liquidation of fund assets, German open-end real estate
fund investors have the option of selling their shares on the secondary market. This option
is available both for funds in a liquidation phase, as well as those under share redemption
suspensions. In this study, we refer to both types as “distressed” open-end real estate
3M&G Property Portfolio, Henderson UK Property PAIF, Standard Life UK Real Estate Fund, Aviva Investors
Property trust, Columbia Threadneedle UK Property Authorised Investment Fund (PAIF), Canada Life UK
Property Fund, Aberdeen UK Property Fund.
4This study focuses solely on retail funds. We exclude semi-institutional funds, which are primarily intended
for institutional investors. They are legally classiﬁed as retail funds, but the minimum investment begins
at EUR 10.000. Consequently, semi-institutional funds do not ﬁt our framework, where the supply and
demand of fund shares on the secondary market, and, hence, ultimately the discount to NAV per share,
is determined by the unwillingness of retail investors to go through the liquidation process. Moreover,
we exclude the UniImmoGlobal fund, which was forced to close only from March to June 2011 due to
devaluations of real estate assets in Japan after the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami.
5The next section provides some regulatory background on the liquidation regime of German open-end
real estate funds and an overview of the recent crisis.
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This ﬁgure shows total NAV volume and total market capitalization of all distressed open-end real estate funds from 2007:1 to 2016:6.
The above ﬁgure illustrates the absolute deviation between NAV andmarket prices, while the below ﬁgure shows the relative deviation.
Total market capitalization is deﬁned as the sum of the fund-speciﬁc stock market prices weighted by the total number of shares of
each fund. Total fund volume is calculated as the sum of the total number of fund shares multiplied by the NAV of each fund.
funds. Although the fund companies continue to regularly publish NAVs per share, the
price per share on the secondary market becomes a function of supply and demand.
The principles of supply and demand suggest that secondary market prices should be
lower than NAV if a large number of investors choose not to wait for the liquidation
process to proceed. Due to the increasing supply of fund shares, market prices must
fall below NAV to realign supply and demand. Furthermore, the loss of the “buy-back”
guarantee, as well as the shift from a relatively stable appraisal-based pricing system to
more volatile transaction-based share prices, justiﬁes a risk premium.
Figure 4.1 conﬁrms this intuition. A comparison of the NAV-based total fund size of
all distressed real estate funds (blue line) and their total market capitalization based on
secondary market share prices (black line) reveals that investors engaging in secondary
market trading on average accept substantial discounts to NAV.
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This ﬁgure shows the development of the discount to NAV for each fund from 2007:1 to 2016:6. The discount to NAV indicates the
negative deviation between the fund’s NAV and the secondary market price in percent.
Beyond these general considerations, however, little is known about the speciﬁc factors
that explain the discount to NAV of distressed open-end real estate funds. Figure 4.2
shows that the discounts of distressed real estate funds differ substantially across funds.
Therefore, we aim to identify the fund-speciﬁc factors behind the heterogeneity of NAV
spreads across funds. In addition, and despite the different closing dates, the individual
discounts to NAV tend to be highly correlated between funds. Thus, we explore whether
the correlations of NAV discounts are driven by marketwide sentiment.
Our goal is to answer these questions by providing a comprehensive analysis of the factors
that explain discounts to NAV of distressed open-end real estate funds. NAV discounts
have already been extensively studied in the context of closed-end funds (e.g., Lee et
al. (1991); Pontiff (1996); Chay and Trzcinka (1999) and of publicly traded REITs or real
estate operating companies (REOCs) (e.g., Barkham and Ward (1999); Brounen and ter
Laak (2005); Patel et al. (2009). The major difference between these strands of the
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literature and this study is that the discounts to NAV of closed-end funds or REITs may
theoretically persist forever. In contrast, the forced liquidation of the funds in our sample
ensures investors actually receive payouts. This enables us to study NAV discounts in a
new setting. On the one hand, it is an advantage that funds are liquidated and investors
are paid. However, on the other hand, a “forced liquidation” may result in a poorer
bargaining position for selling property, which by itself may justify a discount to NAV.
Understanding what drives NAV discounts of distressed open-end real estate funds is
relevant for all market participants. The magnitude of the discount to NAV is not only
relevant for existing investors, for whom it represents a loss of shareholder value, but also
for potential new investors, for whom it may represent an investment opportunity. Fund
families may also be concerned about discounts to NAV. Their prestige may be damaged
if investors not only suffer liquidity constraints, but also high discounts to NAV on the
secondary market. Moreover, regulators may be interested in fostering an environment
where discounts to NAV are as small as possible.
Our empirical study is based on a monthly panel of nine distressed open-end real estate
funds in Germany. It covers the complete crisis and post-crisis periods, from October
2008, when the ﬁrst funds suspended share redemptions, through June 2016.6
Our set of explanatory variables is comprised of fund-speciﬁc, external variables and con-
trol variables. We use the leverage ratio, the liquidity ratio, management fees, extraor-
dinary payouts, economic growth of target markets, and tenancy of fund properties to
explain the fund-speciﬁc, or idiosyncratic, part of the NAV discount. External variables
are used to capture the systematic component. Here, we use closures of other funds and
total number of funds in liquidation. Both variables can also be interpreted as spillover ef-
fects from other real estate funds. Moreover, we control for the total amount of net fund
ﬂows to all real estate funds that continue to sell and redeem shares. We also include
macroeconomic uncertainty indices, which have become increasingly popular as a means
to account for the rising degree of economic uncertainty in the aftermath of the global
6Nine of the ten closed retail funds were relatively comparable to each other. However, the HansaImmobilia
Fund was liquidated without adhering to the closing period of twenty-four months. We exclude that fund
from our dataset.
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ﬁnancial crisis. We control for funds’ past performance, size, and share of institutional
holdings.
Using ﬁxed-effects panel regressions to explain the discount to NAV, we provide evi-
dence that fundamental, fund-speciﬁc variables play a substantial role. In particular, we
ﬁnd that the discount to NAV increases with rising leverage ratios, and decreases with
the ratio of cash holdings. This is consistent with the idea that the risk of distressed
real estate funds depends primarily on whether appraisal values are reliable. This risk in-
creases (decreases) with rising leverage (liquidity). We also ﬁnd that the discount to NAV
is related to potential conﬂicts of interest between investors and fund management. It
increases concurrent with management fees, and is smaller for funds with higher extraor-
dinary payouts, suggesting the beneﬁt of investor-friendly behavior. We ﬁnd evidence of
industrywide spillover effects because the discount to NAV increases when other funds
announce liquidations. Finally, we provide evidence that the discount to NAV is related
to our proxies for investor sentiment. We ﬁnd that discounts to NAV decrease with the
total level of capital ﬂows into the open-end fund industry, and increase with the degree
of macroeconomic uncertainty.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview
of the German open-end fund crisis and some regulatory details. Section 4.3 describes
our set of explanatory variables and how they relate to the extant literature. Section 4.4
describes our data, while our regression results are in section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes.
ƁŻſ ơƵƲ ƔƲƿƺƮƻ ƜƽƲƻźƒƻƱ ƓǂƻƱ Ɛƿƶǀƶǀ ƮƻƱ ƟƲƴǂƹƮǁƼƿǆ
ƏƮưƸƴƿƼǂƻƱ
When a German open-end real estate fund suspends share redemptions, it tries to sell
enough properties to increase its liquidity reserves, and reopen and ultimately fulﬁll all
redemption requests. Funds that fail to reopen within twenty-four months are forced to
liquidate their portfolios and pay out the proceeds to investors.
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Selling properties within a particular time frame can be difficult, however, especially dur-
ing, e.g., times of low transaction activity in the real estate markets, such as during the
aftermath of the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis. Lower asking prices can help increase the
probability of a sale. However, in order to avoid “ﬁre sales”, the German legislature
enacted sale price restrictions tied to appraisal values. During the ﬁrst twelve months
following share redemption suspensions, funds are thus not permitted to sell properties
below their most recent appraised values. After the ﬁrst twelve months, the funds may
sell properties at a discount of up to 10% relative to the last appraised value.
These legal restrictions may be viewed as overly burdensome for distressed real estate
funds that are attempting to reopen. However, funds are allowed to reappraise their
properties prior to transactions, which effectively enables ﬁre sale prices. However, large
discounts of transaction prices relative to previous appraisal values can destroy trust in a
fund’s appraisal values. And a “vicious circle” may result if a lack of conﬁdence in a fund’s
published NAVs leads to higher redemption requests when the fund attempts to reopen.
The liquidation process is overseen by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin),
which determines an individual time line for every fund (typically between three and ﬁve
years). Subsequently, the investment company is no longer in charge of managing further
liquidations. Rather, a third-party depository bank is tasked with selling the entire real
estate portfolio.7 Funds in liquidationmay sell properties at discounts of up to 20% during
the ﬁrst twelve months of the liquidation process. Twelve months later, discounts of up
to 30% are authorized. After the determined liquidation date, the fund’s management
is transferred to a depository bank, which can sell the assets without restrictions. This
event also leads to an extraordinary tax burden for all investors, because a land transfer
tax applies.
Figure 4.3 provides a detailed overview of the number and total fund size of German
open-end real estate funds that either suspended share redemptions (orange bars), or
were already in the process of fund liquidation (red bars). The graph also shows the
7As a consequence of the open-end real estate fund crisis, the regulatory regime was modiﬁed several
times. However, our analysis is unaffected by these changes because all the funds in our analysis were
liquidated under the prior investment laws (InvG, effective from 1/1/2004 -7/22/2013).
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This ﬁgure shows the number and the total fund size of the German open-end real estate funds, that either suspended share redemp-
tions (orange bars) or were in the process of fund liquidation (red bars). The graph also shows the number and the total fund size of
any reopenings (green bars).
number and total fund size of reopenings (green bars). The crisis began in October 2008,
when nine funds with total assets under management of EUR 28 billion suspended share
redemptions. The reopening of seven of these funds over the following twelve months
indicated a recovery. However, these reopenings proved unsustainable. Through May
2010, the total fund size of funds that had suspended share redemptions had returned to
previous levels of around EUR 27 billion, but the ﬁrst fund liquidations were announced
in October 2010. As of August 2012, all previously suspended funds had entered the
liquidation phase.8 The shrinking fund volume over time shown in Figure 4.3 is due to
two effects: 1) distributions to investors facilitated by property disposals, and 2) falling
property appraisal values following impairments. As of June 2016, EUR 10 billion of
invested capital was yet to be distributed to shareholders under liquidation.
8Table 4.1 provides the exact dates of all the major events for the distressed real estate funds in our sample.
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ơƮƯƹƲ ƁŻžƇ ƜǃƲƿǃƶƲǄ ƼƳ ƑƶǀǁƿƲǀǀƲƱ ƜƽƲƻźƒƻƱ ƟƲƮƹ ƒǀǁƮǁƲ ƓǂƻƱǀ
fund ﬁrst closure second closure notice liquidation depository bank
CS Euroreal A 10/30/08 - 06/29/09 05/20/10 05/21/12 04/30/17
SEB ImmoInvest 10/29/08 - 06/02/09 05/06/10 05/07/12 04/30/17
KanAm Grundinvest 10/28/08 - 07/08/09 05/06/10 03/01/12 12/31/16
AXA Immoselect 10/28/08 - 08/28/09 11/19/09 10/20/11 10/20/14
DEGI International 10/31/08 - 01/31/09 11/17/09 10/25/11 10/15/14
DEGI Europa - 10/31/08 10/01/10 09/30/13
UBS (D) 3 Sector RE 10/31/08 - 10/31/09 10/06/10 09/05/12 09/05/15
TMW Immobilien 10/28/08 - 10/31/09 02/08/10 05/31/11 05/31/14
Morgan Stanley P2 Value - 10/30/08 10/26/10 09/30/13
This table provides an overview of the relevant events for all distressed public open-end real estate funds, particularly date of ﬁrst
closure, reopening date, date of their second closure, date of liquidation announcement, and date of the depository bank taking
control of the liquidation process.
ƁŻƀ ƟƲƹƮǁƲƱ ƙƶǁƲƿƮǁǂƿƲ ƮƻƱ ƕǆƽƼǁƵƲǀƲǀ
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to address NAV discounts of dis-
tressed funds in general, and distressed real estate funds in particular. While there is no
extant literature that relates directly to our work, our research questions are related to
the literature on the closed-end fund puzzle.
In essence, the basket of stocks held by these funds trades for less than the combined
market value of the individual stocks held in the portfolio (Cherkes (2003)). Thus, even
in the presence of professional fund management, the pooling appears to reduce the
portfolio’s worth. According to Lee et al. (1991), closed-end fund discounts are the
result of private investor sentiment, or what are referred to as noise traders. An irrational
downturn in investor sentiment leads to larger discounts. Therefore, holding a closed-end
mutual fund portfolio can result in larger risk, or uncertainty, than holding the underlying
fund’s assets.
Our research is also related to the literature on the discounts (or premia) to NAV of publicly
traded REITs or REOCs.9 It is not uncommon for REITs to trade at a premium to their
NAV, but they also frequently trade at discounts to NAV. Similarly to closed-end funds,
Barkham and Ward (1999) ﬁnd evidence that supports the noise trader hypothesis for
listed property companies in the U.K.
9In contrast to common stocks and mutual funds, there is no public market for the real estate assets alone.
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The difference between these two strands of the literature and this study is that distressed
real estate funds are forced to sell off their property portfolios and pay out the proceeds
to investors. Open-end real estate funds can be seen as a mixed form between listed
and direct real estate. While REITs are as liquid as common stocks, open-end real estate
funds are only liquid as long as investors can redeem their shares to the fund or the
sponsor of the fund. On the other hand, the shares of “closed” open-end real estate
fund can be traded on the secondary markets, often at substantial discounts. In this
context, the discount to NAV of distressed open-end real estate funds can be interpreted
as the price of reduced liquidity and uncertainty regarding the appraisal values of the
fund’s properties.10 This enables us to study how investors price the risks associated with
the forced liquidation of a direct-property portfolio.
Figure 4.2 shows that the discounts to NAV of distressed real estate funds are hetero-
geneous across funds, which suggests they are driven by fund-speciﬁc, or idiosyncratic,
variables. Our ﬁrst three hypotheses and the respective proxy variables reﬂect these po-
tential internal factors. Figure 4.2 also reveals that the discounts to NAV are correlated
between the funds over time. Lee et al. (1991) document that this is true of closed-end
funds as well, which indicates that NAV discounts may be affected by either industrywide
or macroeconomic sentiment. Hypotheses 4 and 5 reﬂect these potential external factors.
ƁŻƀŻž ƓƶƻƮƻưƶƮƹ ƙƲǃƲƿƮƴƲ
The anticipation of lower transaction prices compared to current appraisal values is a po-
tential rational explanation for substantial discounts to NAV. The effect of lower appraisal
values or transaction prices on a fund’s NAV is ampliﬁed further by the amount of ﬁnan-
cial leverage used by a fund. For example, if investors anticipate that the next appraisal
round will reveal a 10% decrease in property values, then a leverage ratio of 50% would
justify a 20% discount to NAV, assuming all the fund’s assets are invested in real estate.
Thus, the leverage ratio risk may be reﬂected in a lower market price relative to the NAV
10Schweizer et al. (2013).
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per share. Bond and Shilling (2004) and Brounen and ter Laak (2005), using data on
European public property companies, ﬁnd that leverage is positively correlated with NAV
discounts. Likewise, the discount to NAV of distressed open-end real estate funds may
also increase with the leverage ratio.
Mirroring this principle, we ﬁnd that the opposite effect may occur when a fund has high
cash reserves. Because distressed real estate funds may be forced to sell their portfolios,
they tend to exhibit rising liquidity ratios until they pay out proceeds to investors. In
contrast to the appraisal values of the properties, a fund’s liquid assets generally have
little to zero market or appraisal risk, and can be considered safe for investors. Consistent
with the idea that investors appreciate higher liquidity ratios, Fecht and Wedow (2014)
ﬁnd that lower liquidity ratios are associated with higher redemptions. Therefore, we
expect a negative relationship between the liquidity ratio of a fund and its discount to
NAV. The potential impact of the fundamental risk associated with the degree of ﬁnancial
leverage employed by a fund leads to Hypothesis 1:
ƕǆƽƼǁƵƲǀƶǀ žƇ ơƵƲ ƱƶǀưƼǂƻǁ ǁƼ ƛƎƣ ƶƻưƿƲƮǀƲǀ (ƱƲưƿƲƮǀƲǀ) ǄƶǁƵ ǁƵƲ ƹƲǃƲƿƮƴƲ (ƹƶƾǂƶƱƶǁǆ)
ƿƮǁƶƼ ƼƳ Ʈ ƳǂƻƱ.
ƁŻƀŻſ ƐƼƻﬂƶưǁǀ ƼƳ ƖƻǁƲƿƲǀǁ
According to the closed-end fund literature, management costs are an important, but
ambivalent, determinant of NAV discounts. For example, if the expected return on the
equity portfolio of a closed-end fund is 7%, fund fees of 1.5% per year can considerably
reduce that return after fees. Gemmill and Thomas (2002) document that small closed-
end funds, which often display large management costs, exhibit larger discounts to NAV.
On the other hand, Lenkey (2015) shows that the relation between NAV discounts and
management fees is not stable due to two opposing effects 1) larger fees reduce share-
holder value 2) larger fees increase management abilities.
During normal times, investors in open-end real estate funds can “vote with their feet,”
and sell their shares back to the fund if they believe management’s fees are excessive. This
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would decrease assets under management and hence fee income, thereby incentivizing
fund managers to act in line with investor interests. In contrast, investors in distressed
real estate funds do not have the option to redeem their shares to the fund, and are fully
exposed to the fees set by management. They can only choose to sell their shares on the
secondary market, where assets under management remain unaffected. This potential
conﬂict of interest between fund management and investors can have an effect on NAV
discounts if investors in expensive funds are more inclined to sell their shares on the
secondary market.
A similar conﬂict of interest arises because fund managers of distressed real estate funds
maximize fee income by delaying the liquidation process. During normal times, investors
in open-end real estate funds receive an annual dividend. When a distressed fund is in
the process of liquidating, however, investors receive additional “extraordinary” payouts
from the stepwise liquidation of the fund’s real estate assets, often on a semiannual ba-
sis. Here, large payouts may signal that fund management is acting in the interest of
investors, and is interested in a speedy liquidation process. Accordingly, distressed funds
with higher payout ratios are expected to trade at lower discounts to NAV compared to
their peers with smaller payout ratios. Furthermore, investors in funds with large NAV
discounts may appreciate payouts, because the dividend yields are considerably higher
when calculated with respect to discounted share prices rather than NAVs. Consistent
with this idea, the literature on the closed-end fund puzzle ﬁnds that low dividend pay-
outs lead to larger discounts to NAV (Pontiff (1996); Gemmill and Thomas (2002); Cherkes
(2003); and Malkiel and Xu (2005)). The potential conﬂict of interest between fund man-
agement and investors leads to our second hypothesis concerning the discount to NAV
of distressed real estate funds:
ƕǆƽƼǁƵƲǀƶǀ ſƇ ơƵƲ ƱƶǀưƼǂƻǁ ǁƼ ƛƎƣ ƶƻưƿƲƮǀƲǀ ǄƵƲƻ ǁƵƲ ƳǂƻƱ ƺƮƻƮƴƲƺƲƻǁ ƱƼƲǀ ƻƼǁ Ʈưǁ
ƶƻ ǁƵƲ ƶƻǁƲƿƲǀǁ ƼƳ ƳǂƻƱ ƶƻǃƲǀǁƼƿǀ.
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ƁŻƀŻƀ ƝƼƿǁƳƼƹƶƼ ƞǂƮƹƶǁǆ
The anticipation of lower transaction prices than current appraisal values is a potentially
rational explanation for substantial discounts to NAV. Recent research suggests that GDP
may be a useful variable to forecast future direct real estate prices. Using a global sample
of office property prices, De Wit and van Dijk (2003) ﬁnd that GDP positively inﬂuences
direct real estate prices. Accordingly, NAV discounts may be smaller if the fund’s assets
are located in countries with positive GDP developments.
Another measure of the quality of a fund’s property portfolio is average tenancy rate.
Wurtzebach et al. (1991) ﬁnd that high office vacancy rates (or low tenancy rates) are as-
sociated with decreasing commercial real estate returns in the U.S. Hence, higher tenancy
rates may be perceived as a signal of the quality of a fund’s property portfolio, as well
as more stable cash ﬂows and property values. In other words, we posit that funds with
higher tenancy rates are less likely to devalue their properties in the near future. We thus
expect a negative relationship between a fund’s tenancy rate and its discount to NAV.
Taken together, our two proxies for fund portfolio quality lead to Hypothesis 3:
ƕǆƽƼǁƵƲǀƶǀ ƀƇ ơƵƲ ƱƶǀưƼǂƻǁ ǁƼ ƛƎƣ ƱƲưƿƲƮǀƲǀ ǄƶǁƵ Ʈ ƳǂƻƱ’ǀ ƽƿƼƽƲƿǁǆ ƽƼƿǁƳƼƹƶƼ ƾǂƮƹƶǁǆ.
ƁŻƀŻƁ ƠƽƶƹƹƼǃƲƿ ƒƳƳƲưǁǀ
Figure 4.2 shows the correlation of NAV discounts between funds over time, and suggests
the presence of a systematic component simultaneously affecting the NAV discounts of
all funds. The ﬁnancial fragility of open-end real estate funds exhibits some striking simi-
larities to the banking sector. Spillover risk (where problems from one bank can spread to
others within the system) is a prime concern for authorities and a rationale for regulating
the ﬁnancial system. For example, Aharony and Swary (1983) ﬁnd that large bank failures
can lead to falling prices for solvent bank stocks if the failures are caused by systemwide
banking problems.
In the context of distressed real estate funds, negative spillover effects may arise from
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the announcement of another fund’s closure or liquidation. Such an announcement by
other funds may increase doubts over the future development of the overall asset class.
Investors in distressed real estate funds who speculated on a successful reopening may
see their hopes vanish with the announcement of another fund’s suspensions of share
redemptions. Similarly, the announcement of another distressed real estate fund enter-
ing the liquidation phase may imply that the last chance for a successful reopening has
passed. As a result of negative industry news, the share prices of distressed funds may
fall even further, thereby increasing the discount to NAV. This leads us to Hypothesis 4:
ƕǆƽƼǁƵƲǀƶǀ ƁƇ ơƵƲ ƱƶǀưƼǂƻǁ ǁƼ ƛƎƣ ƶƻưƿƲƮǀƲǀ ƱǂƲ ǁƼ ƻƲƴƮǁƶǃƲ ǀƽƶƹƹƼǃƲƿ ƲƳƳƲưǁǀ ƳƿƼƺ ǁƵƲ
ƮƻƻƼǂƻưƲƺƲƻǁ ƼƳ ƼǁƵƲƿ ƳǂƻƱ’ǀ ưƹƼǀǂƿƲǀ Ƽƿ ƹƶƾǂƶƱƮǁƶƼƻǀ.
ƁŻƀŻƂ ƠƲƻǁƶƺƲƻǁ
Our next hypothesis aiming to explain the systematic component of NAV discounts relates
to industrywide or macroeconomic sentiment. In particular, we focus on variables that
proxy for industrywide sentiment toward the asset class. If investor sentiment reﬂects
investor behavior toward an asset class, we expect there to be an effect on the returns of
the underlying securities. The returns on the secondary market may then directly impact
a widening or a compression of the discount to NAV.
Indro (2004) ﬁnds a high correlation between aggregate equity fund ﬂows and other
measures of investor sentiment, such as the bullishness of individual investors or newslet-
ter writers. This suggests that fund ﬂows can be a useful proxy for investor sentiment.
Consistent with the hypothesis that investor sentiment affects returns, Warther (1995)
ﬁnds a strong relationship between aggregate ﬂows into equity mutual funds and con-
temporaneous returns of the securities held by these funds. Similarly, Ben-Rephael et
al. (2012) ﬁnd that monthly aggregate shifts between bond funds and equity funds are
positively correlated with contemporaneous aggregate stock market excess returns.
In addition to industry-speciﬁc sentiment, the returns and NAV discounts of distressed
real estate funds may also be driven by macroeconomic sentiment. Two popular uncer-
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tainty indices are used commonly in the literature. First, the Economic Policy Uncertainty
Index of Baker et al. (2015) features prominently in a plethora of research (e.g., Eu-
ropean Central Bank (2013), European Commission (2013), and International Monetary
Fund (2014)).11 Second, the implied volatility index (VIX), which proxy for stock market
uncertainty, measure anticipated (implied) stock market risk based on the difference be-
tween stock prices and stock price futures (e.g., Baker et al. (2015); Bekaert et al. (2013)).
This measure is important because the funds are subject to common stock market risk
after the event of closing. The expected impact of sentiment on the discount to NAV of
distressed funds is summarized in Hypothesis 5:
ƕǆƽƼǁƵƲǀƶǀ ƂƇ ơƵƲ ƱƶǀưƼǂƻǁ ǁƼ ƛƎƣ ƶƻưƿƲƮǀƲǀ ǄƶǁƵ ƶƺƽƿƼǃƶƻƴ ƶƻǃƲǀǁƼƿ ǀƲƻǁƶƺƲƻǁ.
ƁŻƁ ƑƮǁƮŹ ƚƲǁƵƼƱƼƹƼƴǆ ƮƻƱ ƠƮƺƽƹƲ ƑƲǀưƿƶƽǁƶƼƻ
ƁŻƁŻž ƑƮǁƮ
Our sample consists of the population of all nine distressed German open-end real estate
funds.12 Table 4.1 provides an overview of the funds, as well as their closure, reopening,
and liquidation dates.
Our panel dataset covers the October 2008 through June 2016 period. The starting
point coincides with the closure of the nine funds. Subsequently, substantial divergences
between secondary market prices and NAVs emerged, which led to the NAV spreads
examined in this study.
Following Lee et al. (1991) and Barkham and Ward (1999), we calculate the discount to
NAV as the difference between current NAV and the contemporary fund’s market price
divided by current NAV. NAVs are published daily for each fund by the fund management
(KVG); market prices are provided by the Hamburg-Hannover stock exchange.
11The full list can be found at: www.policyuncertainty.com/research.
12As noted earlier, we exclude the HansaImmobilia fund and the UniImmoGlobal fund.
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Our fund-speciﬁc variables are hand-collected from the monthly fact sheets found on the
individual fund websites, as well as from funds’ semiannual and annual reports. Note
that several funds are managed by depository banks that no longer provide monthly fact
sheets. Their annual and semiannual reports are also less detailed. Hence, our explanatory
variables are somewhat less up-to-date toward the end of the sample.
The share of institutional owners per fund comes from Morningstar Direct. We also col-
lect industrywide data on fund ﬂows from the German Investment and Asset Manage-
ment Association (BVI), which collects data about net ﬂows directly from its members and
represents the vast majority of the German mutual fund industry. The dataset includes
the monthly net ﬂows of forty-eight public and semi-institutional German open-end real
estate funds in our sample period.13 Data on GDP come from the OECD.
ƁŻƁŻſ ƟƲǀƲƮƿưƵ ƑƲǀƶƴƻ ƮƻƱ ƑƲﬁƻƶǁƶƼƻ ƼƳ VƮƿƶƮƯƹƲǀ
We use a panel regression model to examine the determinants of NAV discounts for dis-
tressed real estate funds. Our unbalanced panel consists of 708 fund-month observations.
The key variable of interest is the discount to NAV of fund i at the end of month t, which
is calculated as follows:
Discount to NAVi,t =
Stock market pricei,t
NAV per sharei,t
− 1 (4.1)
13Since 2013, according to the German Central Bank, extraordinary payouts of distressed funds have been
considered as capital outﬂows (BVI (2016)). In contrast, all extraordinary payouts of distressed funds are
set equal to zero in order to standardize the calculations for both healthy and distressed funds.
84
4.4. Data, Methodology and Sample Description
For the purpose of our empirical tests, we estimate the following panel regression model:
Discount to NAVi,t = α + β1 ∆ Leveragei,t−1 + β2 ∆ Liquidityi,t−1 + β3 ∆ TERi,t−1
+ β4 Extraordinary Payoutsi,t
+ β5 Economic Growth Target Marketsi,t−1 + β6 ∆ Tenancyi,t−1
+ β7 Flows Asset Classt + β8 Event Fund Liquidationt
+ β9 Event Fund Closuret
+ β10 Policy Uncertainty Index Europet + β11 V IX Europet
+ β12 ∆ Performi,t−1 + β13 ∆ Fund Sizei,t−1
β14 ∆ Institutionali,t−1 + β15 Fund Reopeningi,t
+ vi,t
(4.2)
We separate our key explanatory variables into fund-speciﬁc, external, and control vari-
ables, as follows.
ƙƲǃƲƿƮƴƲ is the leverage ratio of the fund, calculated as the ratio of the fund’s debt relative
to it’s gross asset value (GAV).
ƙƶƾǂƶƱƶǁǆ is the liquidity ratio, measured as the ratio of the fund’s cash equivalents to GAV.
ơƒƟ represents annual management costs as a percent of fund volume. Because investors
can no longer “vote with their feet,” we expect to ﬁnd higher fees associated with higher
NAV discounts.
ƒǅǁƿƮƼƿƱƶƻƮƿǆ ƽƮǆƼǂǁǀ are deﬁned as total fund-speciﬁc payouts in a given month relative
to a fund’s NAV. Similarly to the TER ratio, this variable aims to capture the degree of in-
vestor friendliness of a fund’s management. A negative correlation between this variable
and the discount to NAV would indicate a lower degree of conﬂicts of interest between
investors and fund managers, leading to a smaller NAV discount.
ƒưƼƻƼƺƶư ƔƿƼǄǁƵ ơƮƿƴƲǁ ƚƮƿƸƲǁǀ is a fund-speciﬁc GDP growth measure. This variable
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aims to capture the anticipated price development of a fund’s real estate portfolio. It is
calculated as the weighted sum of monthly GDP growth in the individual funds’ target
country markets.
ơƲƻƮƻưǆ represents the proportion of rented to overall space of the real estate fund’s
assets. This variable is used to proxy for a fund’s portfolio quality. As with the previous
variable, which captures the GDP development of the fund’s underlying property markets,
a higher portfolio quality or better outlook is expected to lead to a smaller discount to
NAV.
ƒǃƲƻǁ ƓǂƻƱ ƐƹƼǀǂƿƲ is a 0/1 indicator variable that captures the announcement that at
least one other real estate fund has suspended share redemptions.
ƒǃƲƻǁ ƓǂƻƱ ƙƶƾǂƶƱƮǁƶƼƻ is a dummy variable that indicates another fund is unable to re-
open and has begun the liquidation process. Both events may lead to a deterioration in
investor sentiment. A positive relationship between these events and the discount to NAV
would generally conﬁrm the spillover hypothesis. We also include closure or liquidation
announcements from semi-institutional funds.
ƓƹƼǄǀ ƎǀǀƲǁ ƐƹƮǀǀ are the total net fund ﬂows (newly bought fund shares less redemp-
tions) into all healthy open-end real estate funds. Here, we also include ﬂows into semi-
institutional funds. While only normally functioning open-end real estate funds can have
net ﬂows, we use this variable to capture general investor sentiment toward the asset
class.
PƼƹƶưǆ ƢƻưƲƿǁƮƶƻǁǆ ƖƻƱƲǅ ƒǂƿƼƽƲ aims to capture the degree of political uncertainty in
Europe. To construct this Index, Baker et al. (2015) ﬁrst select two inﬂuential newspa-
pers for each European country, such as, e.g., “Le Monde” and “Le Figaro” for France,
or “Handelsblatt” and “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” for Germany, etc. Next, the au-
thors count the number of articles that include the terms “uncertain,” “uncertainty,” “eco-
nomic,” or “economy,” and at least one policy-relevant item. The count is scaled by the
overall number of articles in each newspaper.
ƣƖX ƒǂƿƼƽƲ is the Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX), commonly referred to as VIX.
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This is our second measure of macroeconomic uncertainty. This index measures the an-
ticipated (implied) stock market risk based on the difference between stock prices and
stock price futures. Both macroeconomic indices are normalized (i.e., the mean was sub-
tracted, and all values subsequently divided by their standard deviations). This transfor-
mation allows us to not only interpret the sign and statistical signiﬁcance of the respective
regression coefficients, but also to compare the magnitudes of both coefficients. Our set
of control variables consists of a fund’s past performance, fund size, and share of institu-
tional owners, as well as a dummy variable indicating whether the distressed real estate
fund of interest already experienced a suspension of share redemptions and subsequent
reopening.
PƲƿƳƼƿƺƮƻưƲ is the appraisal-based rolling twelve-month performance according to BVI.
This variable basically reﬂects the NAV performance. On the one hand, high returns are
indicative of solid fund performance. On the other hand, it may signal that the fund has
not yet adjusted its appraisal values to reﬂect lower market values. This would imply that
NAV per share is expected to fall in the future, thereby justifying a larger discount.
ƓǂƻƱ ƠƶǇƲ is measured in billions of Euros. The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority
(BaFin) of Germany determines an individual liquidation horizon for each fund. Larger
funds tend to receive more time to liquidate their portfolio compared to smaller ones.
Therefore, on the one hand, fund size could be interpreted as a proxy for expected liqui-
dation time. Hence, we would expect a positive relationship between fund size and NAV
discounts. On the other hand, larger funds with longer liquidation horizons might use
an optimized market timing strategy for their property disposals, and could enjoy better
bargaining positions.
ƖƻǀǁƶǁǂǁƶƼƻƮƹ ǀƵƮƿƲƵƼƹƱƲƿǀ represents the share of institutional shareholders as provided
by Morningstar Direct. Here, too, the expected effect is ambivalent. German open-end
real estate funds are predominantly held by retail investors. Thus, due to their low price
volatility and relatively high and stable yields compared to money market interest rates,
conventional wisdom suggests that institutional investors exploited open-end funds as
a cash substitute prior to the fund crisis. We use share of institutional ownership to
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test whether it has an effect on the discount to NAV. Once open-end real estate funds
become distressed, their share prices on the secondary market show substantial price
volatility. Therefore, investors are likely to reevaluate their optimal risk exposure to the
asset class, and could potentially decide to sell their shares. This could lead to further
price pressure on the secondary market, and hence larger discounts to NAV. Consistent
with this idea, Larrain et al. (2017) examine the effect of a regulatory constraint, which
forced pension funds to ﬁre sale their Chilean stock holdings. The authors ﬁnd that those
stocks with the highest selling pressure lost 4% compared to other stocks. Alternatively,
a large percent of well-informed institutional investors may signal high fund quality, and
could be associated with lower discounts to NAV. Evidence in the related literature is
mixed. Barclay et al. (1993) ﬁnd that closed-end funds with large blockholders display
larger discounts. In contrast, Morri and Benedetto (2009) ﬁnd that Italian closed-end real
estate funds with large blockholders tend to exhibit smaller discounts to NAV.
ƓǂƻƱ ƟƲƼƽƲƻƶƻƴ is a dummy variable that indicates whether a distressed real estate fund
has already reopened previously, and hence suspended share redemptions for a second
time. Investors may perceive such funds as less likely to achieve another reopening, thus
leading to larger discounts to NAV.
Our regression results are estimated using cross-sectional ﬁxed effects and
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
Fund-speciﬁc variables generally enter the regression model with one lag, because the
monthly fact sheets are published with a time lag. Also, investors need time to adjust
their decision making process subsequent to changes in key fund indicators. However,
we include extraordinary payouts, net capital inﬂows, dummy variables, and uncertainty
indicators without any lag. Extraordinary Payouts, the closure or liquidation of one or
more speciﬁc open-end real estate funds, is generally a comprehensive event that would
be extensively reported in the media. Therefore, we would expect both institutional and
private investors to recognize the enormity of such an event, and adjust their investment
strategies within one month. Moreover, uncertainty is a prevalent condition. In addition
to the economic interpretation, the statistical signiﬁcance of the coefficients, as well as the
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overall ﬁtness measures like the AIC criteria, support the chosen lag structure as explained
above.
Due to the non-stationarity of the leverage ratio, the liquidity ratio, TER, the tenancy rate,
performance, fund size, and the share of institutional investors, these variables enter the
regression with their ﬁrst differences (∆).
ƁŻƁŻƀ ƑƲǀưƿƶƽǁƶǃƲ ƠǁƮǁƶǀǁƶưǀ
Table 4.2 shows some descriptive statistics on the dependent and explanatory variables.
The Table reveals that the average discount to NAV of distressed real estate funds is 26.7%
with a standard deviation of 13.3%.
The independent variables are separated into three categories: fund-speciﬁc, external
variables, and control variables. The average leverage ratio of all funds is 24.8%. Figure
ơƮƯƹƲ ƁŻſƇ ƜǃƲƿǃƶƲǄ ƠǂƺƺƮƿǆ ƠǁƮǁƶǀǁƶưǀ
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs
Discount to NAV 0.267 0.133 0.000 0.598 783
ƓǂƻƱ ƠƽƲưƶﬁư VƮƿƶƮƯƹƲǀ
Leverage 0.248 0.157 0.000 0.690 837
Liquidity 0.200 0.142 0.003 0.828 837
TER 0.009 0.002 0.003 0.015 837
Extraordinary Payouts 0.012 0.05 0.000 0.565 837
Economic Growth Target Markets 0.001 0.006 -0.031 0.013 836
Tenancy 0.893 0.077 0.595 1.000 815
ƒǅǁƲƿƻƮƹ VƮƿƶƮƯƹƲǀ
Event Fund Liquidation 0.129 0.335 0.000 1.000 837
Event Fund Closure 0.129 0.335 0.000 1.000 837
Flows Asset Class 0.215 0.651 -4.358 1.693 837
Policy Uncertainty Index Europe 174.315 47.613 91.379 394.635 837
VIX Europe 26.400 8.832 14.392 60.677 837
ƐƼƻǁƿƼƹ VƮƿƶƮƯƹƲǀ
Perform -0.045 0.086 -0.389 0.086 816
Fund Size 2.140 1.970 0.069 6.598 837
Institutional 0.111 0.092 0.003 0.368 792
Fund Reopening 0.671 0.470 0.000 1.000 837
This table provides an overview of the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and the number of observations for all
variables.
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4.4 shows that the average leverage ratio diminishes considerably over time. This effect
is to be expected, because funds repay their loans from the proceeds from property dis-
posals. There is also a substantial heterogeneity of leverage ratios across funds. The DEGI
International fund reports a leverage ratio of 0% in June 2014, the Morgan Stanley P2
value fund exhibits a leverage ratio of 69% at the beginning of 2014.
The liquidity ratios also show considerable heterogeneity. The TMW Immobilien Welt-
fonds fund displays a liquidity ratio of 0.3% in May 2016, which is below the regulatory
threshold of 5.0% and is allowed for only a short period of time. However, this fund
exhibit a signiﬁcantly low liquidity ratio over the entire sample period. In contrast, the
UBS 3 Sector Real Estate fund has a liquidity ratio of 21.6% at the closing date, which
rises as high as 82.8% by September 2015. Note that fund strategies partially cause these
substantial differences. During the sample period, DEGI International fund liquidated a
signiﬁcant portion of its assets without substantial extraordinary payouts until October
2014. On average, the liquidity ratio amounts to about 20.0%. Figure 4.4 illustrates
the considerable increase in average liquidity ratios over time due to high sales proceeds
beginning in Q3 2012.
The average total expense ratio is 0.9%. The KanAm Grundinvest fund has the highest
management fees at the end of the sample period in 2016 with 1.5%, while the AXA
Immoselect fund exhibits the lowest fees at 0.3% in October 2008.
The average payout ratio is only 1.2%. The UBS 3 Sector Real Estate fund made an ex-
traordinary payment of about 56.5% of its respective market value in December 2015.
Other funds distributed their payouts more evenly over the sample period, however, the
management of AXA Immoselect fund continuously distributed about 3%-4% of its re-
spective market value per share from 2008 through 2013. Figure 4.4 illustrates the signif-
icant increase in extraordinary payouts due to the accelerating liquidation process, which
began in Q3 2012.
The average GDP growth rate of the fund’s target markets is 0.1% and it ranges from
-3.1% to +1.3%. While there is little heterogeneity across funds regarding this measure,
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Figure 4.4 shows a substantial time variation that is attributable to the economic rebound
following the global ﬁnancial crisis.
The average tenancy rate is 89.3%. Table 4.2 shows that the Morgan Stanley P2 Value
fund exhibited a tenancy rate of 100% over the June-December 2013 period, while TMW
Immobilien Weltfonds fund reported only 76% to 69% during the same period.
On average, a closure or a liquidation occurred in 12.9% of the periods. Consistent with
the spillover hypothesis, Figure 4.4 shows that closures and liquidations tend to cluster
together over time.
The average asset class capital inﬂows are EUR 215 million per month. The funds ex-
perienced strong capital inﬂows of about EUR 1.69 billion in January 2010, and rather
extreme capital outﬂows of EUR 4.36 billion in October 2008.
Figure 4.4 shows that the implied stock market volatility, as measured by VIX Europe,
tends to decline over time. In contrast, the Political Uncertainty Index increases during
the middle of our sample period, when many funds entered the liquidation phase.
Table 4.3 shows a positive correlation on an aggregate level between the absolute level
of the NAV discount and the European Policy Uncertainty Index (general uncertainty) of
(+0.36). However, on the other hand, we observe an inverse relationship between the
absolute level of the discount to NAV and the VIX (stock market uncertainty) of (-0.45).
Although both uncertainty indices share two peaks, in 2008 (global ﬁnancial crisis) and
2012 (European debt crisis), they appear uncorrelated in general.
The rolling twelve-month performance of the funds (based on NAVs) averages -4.5%, and
it ranges from -38.9% to +8.6%. Just as with overall economic development, the variance
of this variable is driven mainly by the time dimension, namely, the global ﬁnancial crisis.
Fund size ranges from EUR 69 million to EUR 6.6 billion. The UBS 3 Sector Real Estate
fund is the smallest fund, with an average size over the entire sample period of EUR
321.0 million. The CS Euroreal A fund is the largest, with an average of EUR 5.0 billion.
Despite the negative time trend, the time dimension explains only a small part of the
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overall variance of the fund size variable. Institutional shareholders on average represent
11.1% of all fund investors. The UBS 3 Sector Real Estate fund reports an institutional
share of up to 37%, while the DEGI Europa never exceeds more than 5%.
According to Table 4.3, the discount to NAV shows a relatively strong negative correla-
tion with the fund size (-0.25) and fund performance (-0.56) variables. Furthermore, the
NAV discounts show a relatively strong positive correlation with the share of institutional
investors (0.35).
ƁŻƂ ƟƲǀǂƹǁǀ
Table 4.4 contains the panel regression results, which are estimated using cross-sectional
and time-ﬁxed effects, as well as the heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.14 Model I
employs only fund-speciﬁc explanatory variables, which are used to test Hypotheses 1-3.
The control variables, used in all models, are also fund-speciﬁc. In models II and III, we
subsequently introduce further explanatory variables that are external to the funds. Model
II includes two industrywide variables, which enables us to test the spillover hypothesis
(Hypothesis 4). Finally, model III also incorporates macroeconomic variables in order to
test Hypothesis 5.15 The standard errors of the regression coefficients are in parentheses.
Our initial analysis focuses on the impact of a fund’s ﬁnancial leverage on its discount
to NAV. We ﬁnd that the discount to NAV increases with the leverage ratio. An increase
in the absolute difference of the leverage ratio by 1% leads on average and c.p. to a
0.089% larger discount to NAV in the next period. Mirroring this principle, the liquidity
ratio has a negative effect on the discount to NAV. A rise in the lagged absolute difference
14Time-ﬁxed effects enable us to control for any unobserved time effects. However, the time dummies also
cause identical regression coefficients for the fund-speciﬁc variables across all three speciﬁcations. In the
next chapter, we describe a possible method by which to conﬁrm the goodness of ﬁt for each model
speciﬁcation.
15In untabulated results, we also control for the time to liquidation date and the legal fund environment,
e.g., the selling restrictions of the real estate properties. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of these reg-
ulatory variables on the discount to NAV. We also ﬁnd no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of regional or sectoral
diversiﬁcation (Herﬁndahl index) on the discount to NAV.
94
4.5. Results
ơƮƯƹƲ ƁŻƁƇ ƒǅƽƹƮƶƻƶƻƴ ǁƵƲ ƑƶǀưƼǂƻǁ ǁƼ ƛƎV
(I) (II) (III)
ƓǂƻƱ ƠƽƲưƶﬁư VƮƿƶƮƯƹƲǀ
∆ Leveragei,t−1 0.0898* 0.0898* 0.0898*
(0.0475) (0.0475) (0.0475)
∆ Liquidityi,t−1 -0.139** -0.139** -0.139**
(0.0588) (0.0588) (0.0588)
∆ TERi,t−1 -1.702 -1.702 -1.702
(5.059) (5.059) (5.059)
Extraordinary Payoutsi,t -0.273*** -0.273*** -0.273***
(0.0643) (0.0643) (0.0643)
Economic Growth Target Marketsi,t−1 0.193 0.193 0.193
(1.936) (1.936) (1.936)
∆ Tenancyi,t−1 -0.116 -0.116 -0.116
(0.0919) (0.0919) (0.0919)
ƒǅǁƲƿƻƮƹ VƮƿƶƮƯƹƲǀ
Event Fund Liquidationi,t - 0.249*** 0.148***
- (0.045) (0.0343)
Event Fund Closurei,t - 0.028 0.00218
- (0.034) (0.0682)
Flows Asset Classi,t - - -0.0308*
- - (0.0142)
Policy Uncertainty Index Europei,t* - - 0.0377***
- - (0.00727)
V IX Europei,t* - - -0.0133
- - (0.0142)
ƐƼƻǁƿƼƹ VƮƿƶƮƯƹƲǀ
∆ Performi,t−1 -0.0788 -0.0788 -0.0788
(0.127) (0.127) (0.127)
∆ Fund Sizei,t−1 0.00239 0.00239 0.00239
(0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0377)
∆ Institutionali,t−1 0.478** 0.478** 0.478**
(0.167) (0.167) (0.167)
Fund Reopeningi,t 0.0283 0.0283 0.0283
(0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0361)
Constant 0.0540** 0.0908*** 0.129**
(0.0198) (0.0263) (0.0408)
Observations 708 708 708
R-squared 0.735 0.735 0.735
Number of funds 9 9 9
This table shows the ﬁxed-effects panel regression results. Model (I) contains the particular inﬂuence of the fund-speciﬁc variables.
Model (II) adds the industry-wide variables to test the spillover hypothesis. Model (III) is the main model, which also includes industry-
wide and macroeconomic proxies for investor sentiment. Policy Uncertainty and VIX Europe Variables are standardized with zero
mean and a standard deviation of one. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1.
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of the liquidity ratio by 1% leads on average and c.p. to a 0.139% lower discount to NAV.
This is plausible, given that a larger share of cash and short-term money market positions
represents money saved for fund investors. Therefore, larger liquidity ratios diminish risk,
which is primarily related to the appraisal values of the real estate portion of the fund.
In summary, both of our proxies are consistent with Hypothesis 1. The discount to NAV
is driven by a fund’s ﬁnancial leverage, since it increases (decreases) with its leverage
(liquidity) ratio.
Next, we examine whether NAV discounts are related to potential conﬂicts of interest be-
tween fund management and investors. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of management
costs (TER) on the NAV discount. Extraordinary payouts, on the other hand, play an im-
portant role. A 1% higher payout leads on average and c.p. to a 0.273% lower discount.
This result is consistent with Hypothesis 2. If fund management regularly pays out high
amounts of liquidity, rather than holding cash or properties to maximize their fee income,
this signals a certain amount of investor friendliness. The practice of extraordinary pay-
outs at time of closing, however, differs considerably among funds in the dataset. Some
closed funds effect constant substantial payments on a semiannual or annual basis. Oth-
ers pay more irregularly or infrequently. A history of regular distributions increases trust
in fund management, and could inﬂuence investors to remain invested.
To test Hypothesis 3, we have two variables that proxy for a fund’s portfolio quality.
First, real estate funds are more likely to be able to sell assets for reasonable prices in
good-performing countries than in countries locked in recession. Investors are informed
about the target market mix through monthly, semiannual, and annual fund reports.
Moreover, investors receive continuous information about economic development via the
media. Both sources of information should theoretically lead to higher demand on the
secondary market for funds invested in more prosperous markets. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the Economic Growth variable on the discount to NAV. Our
second proxy for fund portfolio quality is average tenancy rate. On average, higher quality
properties should be associated with larger tenancy rates, and vice versa. However, the
coefficient on the tenancy rate is not statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero. Hence,
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we ﬁnd no evidence for Hypothesis 3, i.e., NAV discounts do not appear to be driven
by a fund’s portfolio quality. A possible explanation for this result could be that a fund’s
portfolio quality is already sufficiently reﬂected in its NAV. Hence, investors would not
need an additional risk premium, and this would be reﬂected in lower share prices.
Our regression results in model II provide support for the spillover hypothesis. In the case
of another distressed real estate fund failing to reopen and subsequently announcing its
liquidation, the discount to NAV for all distressed funds rises c.p. and on average by
0.249%. This effect remains signiﬁcant, although somewhat weaker, in model III, when
further external variables are included in the regression model. The announcement of
other fund liquidations may lead to diminished hope, and is likely to further deteriorate
investor trust in this asset class. The announcement of other fund closures, on the other
hand, does not appear to signiﬁcantly impact the NAV discount.
We have three proxy variables to test whether NAV discounts are driven by investor sen-
timent. First, we use capital inﬂows into all open-end real estate funds to examine the
impact of investor sentiment toward the speciﬁc asset class on NAV discounts. Model
III documents a signiﬁcant relationship between asset class net ﬂows and the discount
to NAV. Larger fund ﬂows into the overall asset class c.p. and on average diminish the
discount to NAV. Second, we use the European Policy Uncertainty index, which measures
overall macroeconomic uncertainty. An increase in this Index leads c.p. and on average
to a larger NAV discount. In contrast, when we use the VIX to measure speciﬁc stock mar-
ket risk, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect between the VIX Europe and the NAV discount.16
In conclusion, we ﬁnd evidence for Hypothesis 5, when our proxy for investor sentiment
is based on fund ﬂows and political uncertainty.
Regarding our control variables, we ﬁnd a positive relationship between the share of
institutional investors and the discount to NAV. An increase in the absolute difference
of the share of institutional investors by 1% leads on average and c.p. to a 0.478%
larger discount in the next period. Past performance, fund size, and the dummy variable
16In untabulated results, we ﬁnd a positive relationship between the VIX Europe and discounts to NAV
when we run the regression without the Political Uncertainty Index.
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indicating a former fund closure are all statistically insigniﬁcant.
In order to determine the goodness of ﬁt of our models, we use the time dummy co-
efficients of the three model speciﬁcations (I-III). Because the dummy variables have no
economic interpretation, we consider the coefficients to be the unexplained, yet time-
speciﬁc, components of the discount to NAV. Figure 4.5 illustrates how the unexplained
(unsystematic) time effects diminish after we incorporate additional time-dependent vari-
ables into the model. The ﬁgure shows the progression of the time dummy coefficients
over ninety periods from January 2009 to June 2016 (ninety-three periods in total, minus
three periods for the lag structure).
ƓƶƴǂƿƲ ƁŻƂƇ ƑƲǃƲƹƼƽƺƲƻǁ ƼƳ ơƶƺƲ ƑǂƺƺƶƲǀ
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This ﬁgure shows the regression coefficients of the time dummies for the ninety periods from January 2009 through June 2016 (note
there is a loss of three periods at the beginning due to the preferred lag structure). The regression coefficients of these dummy
variables represent the unexplained but time-speciﬁc component of the discount to NAV. The progression of each line near zero
indicates a better ﬁt of the model compared to the other model speciﬁcations, as there is less unexplained variance left.
The time dummy coefficients of model I exhibit considerably positive signs over time.
Moreover, the parabolic progression indicates a time trend that we can account for by
using the monthly time dummies in the regression model. This parabolic progression can
also be seen in the development of the discount to NAV, which increases after the indi-
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vidual closure dates for each fund to a maximum in mid-2012, and signiﬁcantly decreases
thereafter by about 20%-30% until June 2016. Model II exhibits a less distinct time trend.
Model III, which includes all variables, has the best ﬁt and, therefore, the least distinct
time trend of the dummy regression coefficients.
ƁŻƃ ƐƼƻưƹǂǀƶƼƻ
This study examines the discounts to NAV of distressed open-end real estate funds. The
stock market prices of distressed real estate funds are up to 60% lower than their NAVs.
These discounts can be interpreted as a compensation for the valuation risk associated
with the fund liquidation process and a sudden decrease in liquidity.
Open-end real estate funds differ fundamentally from mutual funds, because the under-
lying properties are not traded on a stand-alone basis in public markets as in the case of
stocks. Accounting for the speciﬁc environment of open-end real estate funds, this study
contributes to the literature on NAV discounts, as well as to the empirical literature on
liquidity crises of open-end real estate funds in general.
To explain the major factors driving the NAV discounts of distressed real estate funds,
we categorize the explanatory variables into internal or fund-speciﬁc variables, and into
industrywide or macroeconomic variables that are external to the funds. Overall, we ﬁnd
notable differences between the individual funds (cross-sectional heterogeneity), but the
variance of the discount is also driven considerably by time-dependent factors. On the
fund-speciﬁc side, we provide evidence that the discount to NAV is related to the degree
of ﬁnancial leverage employed by the funds. Funds with high liquidity ratios and/or low
leverage ratios tend to be associated with lower NAV discounts. This suggests that a more
conservative strategy by fund management may help decrease the discounts. Moreover,
we ﬁnd that funds with higher payout ratios trade at lower NAV discounts. This is con-
sistent with our hypothesis that funds paying out more to investors are signaling greater
investor friendliness. However, some factors are not under the control of fund manage-
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ment. For example, we ﬁnd evidence of negative spillover effects from the liquidation
announcements of other funds. Furthermore, we ﬁnd evidence that NAV discounts are
driven by investor sentiment, as evidenced by the impact from fund ﬂows into the asset
class and the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty.
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In summary, fund closure risk, fund performance, and funds discount to NAV were con-
siderably inﬂuenced by fund-speciﬁc factors. Among other internal variables, signiﬁcant
capital inﬂows, a large liquidity ratio, and a low leverage ratio diminish funds closure prob-
ability, as well as discounts to NAV for distressed fund shares. Nevertheless, a larger share
of money market deposits comes at the cost of a lower fund performance. Moreover,
economies of scale and scope lead on one hand to a decreasing fund closure probability
and on the other hand to an increase in fund performance.
In addition, external, uncertainty-related, variables also affect fund closure risk, fund per-
formance, and discounts to NAV. This is a signiﬁcant ﬁnding, since these outside factors
are out of fund managements control and responsibility. These external effects are a
measure of investors general mistrust in the current real estate asset valuation, and the
extant of their prevailing uncertainty about the funds future. This uncertainty led to large
capital outﬂows, and as a consequence to the closure of several funds. Already closed
funds, which lost the majority of their reputation, also show the impact of uncertainty
related factors on their secondary market discounts. Moreover, these discounts to NAV,
as well as the distress status itself lower the bargaining position for the fund management
in the portfolio sales process, which subsequently diminish fund performance.
As long as the fund management is able to reliable guarantee the “buy-back” of fund
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shares to net asset value, fund investors do not question the quality of the funds cur-
rent real estate asset valuation. Whereas in times of overall ﬁnancial turmoil combined
with upcoming fund closures (i.e., negative spillover effects), open-end fund investors
can completely lose trust in their fund investment. If there are no factors, which have a
calming effect on them, like large liquidity ratios or the existence of a leading bank as
the funds sponsor, these fund investors tend to withdraw their invested capital. This is
especially true for funds, which exhibit a large share of institutional investors, since fund
investors also have to be concerned about blockholder risks. Negative spillover effects
also affect discounts to NAV of distressed fund shares. Moreover, there is a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence of investor sentiment proxied by capital inﬂows into the asset class and general
macroeconomic uncertainty on funds discount to NAV.
In times of large uncertainty, investors do not always act rationally, which can be seen in
the exaggerated discounts to NAV up to 60% in the period from 2012 to 2014. Most fund
investors and market participants simple overstate the fund investors imminent losses,
which would arise subsequent to fund closure or liquidation announcements. This creates
a proﬁtable investment opportunity for other potential fund investors, which could buy
distressed fund shares on the secondary market to reasonable prices.
Open-end real estate funds are crucial for German private investors, since these indirect in-
vestment vehicles mitigate signiﬁcant risks associated with direct real estate investments.
Therefore, and due to the current low interest rates, German open-end real estate funds
show strong capital inﬂows since 2015. Nevertheless, in succession of this fund crisis,
there was and still is a large uncertainty about an investment in open-end real estate
funds, and particularly in distressed fund shares.
The purpose of this thesis is to diminish this uncertainty by identifying the major inﬂuen-
tial factors, which led to the open-end real estate fund crisis and affect all topics related
to this special event. The new legislative environment with a minimum holding period
for fund shares of twenty-four months and a notice period of twelve months diminish
the likelihood of further fund closures. Due to this new law regime, the fund manage-
ment provides a liquidity transformation for fund investors only on a limited basis, which
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signiﬁcantly decrease the liquidity transformation risk. Nevertheless, funds, which were
forced to close later on, were on average not the worst-performing funds or differ on
average substantially from the remaining healthy funds. Hence, further fund closures are
not impossible, even though less likely, since the intrinsic closure risk of the open-end
structure persists for all remaining German open-end real estate funds.
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